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More setbacks for openness 
Suharto~ statement in his August 1990 address about human rights and the need for more openness 
has led nowhere. In the last quarter of 1990, things moved decisively in the opposite direction. The 
London Economist [ 15 December 1990 }, stung by its own dose of censorship, wrote grimly, under the 
heading, "The door slams": "The on -again, off-again liberalisation that Indonesia has been pursuing 
since the spring now seems decidedly off. " 
There has been a new wave of book and poetry bans and 
ominous warnings to publishing houses. Ironically, it has 
been left to Admiral Sudomo, who was for years com-
mander of the army's infamous security command, to 
mollify troubled cultural workers and the media with empty 
promises. 
The Kecoa tragedy 
The tragedy that has befallen a comic opera has brought to 
a climax the censorship problem in Indonesia. Opera Kecoa 
(Cockroach Opera) portrays life among the poor of Jakarta, 
the prostitutes, street vendors and transvestites who are 
familiar to any visitor to the city, the butt of contempt and 
discrimination from the police and the municipal authorities , 
who want to tum the city into a respectable metropolis. It 
tells the story of a transvestite victimised .by injustice. 
Kecoa is a production of Teater Koma whose play, 
Suksesi, was banned by the Jakarta police in October. 
Although the unspoken reason for Suksesi's sad end was 
obvious, dealing as it does with a conflict involving the 
greedy and ambitious daughter of a king (no prizes' for 
guessing who felt off ended), the blow directed at Kecoa has 
more general implications for artistic freedom. As a sign of 
how things have deteriorated, Kecoa had three successful 
runs in the 1980s without any problems. 
When it was about to start a run in November, producer 
N. Riantiamo was told hours before the first performance 
that the Jakarta police had refused a licence. A so-called 
izin . keramaian - a pennit for piJbli~ . ~V~~.~ whjch attract 
crowds - is. required for theatrical performances. Jakarta 
police chief, Major-General M.H. Ritonga said permission 
had been refused because the play was "not educational". 
"It highlights pornography, transvestites, proslitutes. What 
torr he asked. (Kompas, 30 November 1990) 
.. Coming so soon after the Suksesi closure, the Koma 
troupe was shattered and demoralised. Whereas Riantiamo 
had responded to the earlier clampdown by saying he would 
go on writing, come what may, his response to the Kecoa 
tragedy was to say he would write nothing more for the 
time being and close down the theatre for two years. 
The Kecoa affair, on top of the police order to the poet, 
Rendra, to exclude two poems from a poetry reading, 
provoked angry responses from many artists and writers. 
A large delegation of artists made a highly publicised visit 
to Parliament where MPs joined in criticising the police, .. 
only proving how powerless they are. ., 
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CENSORSHIP 
Sudomo to the rescue 
They next visited (retired) Admiral Sudomo, Coordinating 
Minister for Political and Security Affairs, the one man in 
government who, since the August speech by Suharto, has 
spoken out in favour of less press censorship. For all his 
fine words however, Sudomo could not stop Information 
Minister Harmoko from cancelling Monitor's licence to 
publish or from halting the circulation of the International 
Herald Tribune and the Australian Financial Review for 
publishing an article that told a few home truths about the 
president's family. [See TAPOL ,Bulletin, No. 102] 
Sudomo sympathised with ]}is aggrieved guests; Rendra, 
he said, could recite the off ending poems - which he did, 
there and then - and Koma Theatre could put on Kecoa 
(though nothing has happened since to suggest that this is 
so). Then the discussion turned to more serious matters: 
\\r .~;, , · ~~,\.~ 
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how to devise a system of assessment and permit-granting, 
a code of ethics for the performing arts. Why not, said 
some of those present, have a 'SIUPP' (the licence required 
by all newspapers) for the performing arts to protect artists 
and groups against arbitrary police action, just as newspa-
pers feel protected (!) when they get their licence to 
publish? In an unpredictable climate, artists would enjoy 
more certainty than hitherto, they argued. 
Sudomo was ready with a blueprint: theatrical shows will 
be assessed in advance by the department of education and 
culture, assisted by the local arts council; once an event 
gets the go-ahead, a police permit wilJ be issued. [Tempo, 
22 December 1990) Whether or not Sudomo is in a position 
to bring this system into being, it can only mark a setback 
for the arts in Indonesia. 
Japan visit cancelled 
But the Kecoa affair has had further repercussions because 
Koma had a Jong-standing invitation to send the show to 
Japan at the invitation of the ASEAN Cultural Centre of the 
Japanese Foundation. Final preparations were under way to 
perform in Tokyo, Fukuoka, Osaka and Maebashi from 22 
February to 7 March 1991 but the Foundation was awaiting 
approval from the State Secretariat in Jakarta. When the 
deadline arrived, the Foundation announced that the trip 
could not proceed as time for final preparations had run out. 
Reeling from this new blow, Riantiarno rushed to Sudomo 
who again made reassuring noises. "Go to Japan," ~e t?ld 
him. The State Secretariat was not responsible for issmng 
permits for overseas visits, he said. Responsibility lies with 
the Department of Education and Culture (which has been 
strenuously denied) and the Foreign Ministry. The State 
Secretariat, he told Riantiarno, had only become involved 
because the Japanese Foundation, through the Japanese 
embassy, had asked the Indonesian government to fund the 
trip and deduct the costs from Japan's economic aid packet 
for 1991. 
The response from the Japanese Foundation was one of 
astonishment. "There is no truth whatever in that," said its 
Jakarta representative. The deputy Japanese ambassador met 
Sudomo to insist that no such request had ever been made. 
A denial also came from the ASEAN Cultural Centre's 
office in Japan. Anyone invited to Japan always has all the 
expences covered by us, they insisted. 
"I'm totally confused. Who do I tum to now?" said 
Riantiamo. The answer may not be pleasant for him to hear, 
wrote Tempo [5 January 1991 ]. The fact is that Kecoa 
cannot go to Japan. "Having been banned at home, how 
could it possibly be allowed to go abroad?" 
The ugliest side of this tragedy is that it has left the arts 
world in a state of confusion. Sudomo has kept mum since 
his absurd claim about funding proved to be pure fabrica-
tion. The State Secretariat has kept mum throughout. Koma 
has closed down in despair. And freedom of expression in 
Indonesia is worth nothing, as the following developments 
prove. Indeed there has been a crescendo of bans on books 
and reminders about the regulations for publishing houses. 
Recent bans 
* The West Java government has banned a poem it says is 
'unethical'. The social and political directorate of the 
provincial government excluded the poem, Berdarah 
(Bleeding) by Sutardji Calzoum Bachry from a list of 
poems to be read in a recitation contest in Bandung. 
Contest committee chairman Danny said the authorities 
found part of the poem 'unethical'. [Jakarta Post, 18 
December 1990] 
* The public prosecutor's office in Surakarta, Central Java, 
has announced the suspension of distribution of four books. 
All four are press clippings compilations by P. Bambang 
Siswoyo: The Lampung Case and the Banning of Two 
Books; The Petition of 50, of 21 and of 58; Political 
Openness; and The National Leadership Succession. 
For the compiler, this was the umpteenth time his clip-
pings compilations on political themes have been banned. 
All the contents were from the press. "So, why are my 
books banned?" he asked. 
The public prosecutor's office said the publishers had 
contravened the regulations by advertising the books in a 
Jakarta weekly before submitting them for examination by 
the authorities. [Kompas, 24 December 1990] 
13 books under investigation 
Books and printed matter which need to be investigated by 
the Attorney General's Office are on the increase. Over the 
past month, more than 13 books have been investigated. 
One being examined is Atheis by Achdiat K. Mihardja. 
Others include Sastra Hindia Belanda [Literature of the 
Dutch Indies], Siti Nurbaya, Dendang, Sukrena Gadis Balit 
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[Sukrena, Bali Girl]. "They are being studied to see whether 
they will disrupt public order. There are 10 criteria for 
banning books," said Attorney General's head of public 
relations, H. Soeprijadi SH. [Jawa Pos 15 December 1990] 
Were the contents contrary to Pancasila and the 1945 
Constitution? Were they contrary to the Broad Guidelines 
of State Policy? Did they diminish or insult the status of the 
President and Vice President? Did they contain elements of 
inter-ethnic conflict? Were they pornographic? Did they 
deal with Marxist, Leninist, and communist thought? The 
other criteria were not given. 
Atheis has been reprinted several times and was first 
published in 1949. Even so, it had to be re-investigated, 
said Soeprojadi. "Every reprinting contains additions. The 
investigation determines whether the additions are danger-
ous or not". 
Soeprijadi also reminded publishers [Kompas, 2 January 
1991] that they are required to submit all books to the 
Attorney-General's Office within 48 hours of publication 
according to Law No. 4/PNPS/1963 which covers the 
publication of books, bulletins, pamphlets, posters or other 
documents intended for circulation. 
More military in Press Council 
A marked shift in favour of the military has occurred in the 
composition of the Press Council, the body whose advice is 
sought when the ministry of information intends to revoke 
a newspaper's licence to publish. 
Several civilian media people who served on the Council 
in 1987-1990 have been replaced for the three-year period 
commencing December 1990. The new members include 
army men who already hold crucial posts in public relations 
and in government. The list of new faces is formidable: 
Brig.General Nurhadi Purwosaputro, spokesperson of the 
armed forces; (retired) Brig.General Sugeng Widjaya who 
is now chair of the journalists' association, PWI (formerly 
also spokesperson of the armed forces); . Brig.General 
Sukarno, deputy attorney-general for intelligence (a key 
post in the executive department which controls the censor-
ship of books and other publications); Colonel Handjojo 
Nitimihardjo, director of the national news agency, Antara; 
(retired) Vice-Admiral Emir Mangaweang, secretary-
general of the ministry of information; and (retired) 
Brig.General Hari Sugiman, director-general for social and 
political affairs at the Department of the Interior, one of the 
most influential posts for political control in the entire 
executive machinery. 
Non-military media people who have lost their seats 
include B.M. Diab, editor and proprietor of Merdeka who 
retired because of age, and Sinek Maryono from PWI, Solo. 
The most telling appointment is the replacement of Muslim 
leader, Abdurrachman Wahid by Nurcholis Madjid. In the 
recent uproar in the Muslim community over a public poll 
in the popular weekly, Monitor (which placed the Prophet 
Mohammad eleventh in readers' preferences), leading to a 
government decision to revoke its licence to publish, 
Madjid fully supported the ban while Wahid argued 
strongly and publicly against it. 
The Council's executive board which is consulted on bans 
is chaired as before by Jacob Oetama, editor of Kompas. He 
not only accepted the government's decision to ban Moni-
tor, a publication owned by Gramedia of which he is 
director, but voluntariJy returned the publishing licence of 
another of his weeklies, Senang, when sentiments began to 
run high against it for publishing a visual impression of the 
CENSORSHIP 
Prophet. 
The Press Council has two commissions, one of which 
deals with ideology - ensuring that the media is loyal to the 
state ideology of Pancasila. [Tempo, 1 December 1990) 11--
Enforcing discipline 
(n an interview on the 41st anniversary of the Jakarta 
military command, Major-General . Kentot Har§eno, . 
who took over as commander cm · 10 ;\.ugust 1990, 
said he wanted to create a safe, orderly arid · 
disciplined capital, in preparation for Visit Indonesia 
Year 1991. 
"Some of ·my measures and policies will certainly ·· 
not be •popular but I am notfookiDg for popularity.I 
·want to enforce public discipline in practical ways.'' 
The aiulouneelliellt came shortly after it was 
. announced that the Jakarta mliitafy conu;nand would 
. "back up" the police iri the conduct of its duties~ The •. 
. ··•· army has started enforcing discipline ~y puiiishllig · 
· ..•. pedestrians who. cro~ the .road or wait for buses at the . 
· 'wrong' place. They .. are forced to . do phy::tical 
exercises such as push-ups, on the spot. The army 
will · also ·assume powers to make arrests; alongside 
· .. the police. 
This drive for discipline, for tuiliing Jakarta into a 
· clean, well-behaved, modem mefropolis, is pro~pted 
by the same mentality that Jed the Jakarta ·. police fo 
ban Opera Kecoa, which putS the spotlight on tlie · 
city's 'riff-ratr. · · · · 
The operation has · been· condemned by the Jakarta 
· Legal Aid Institute who describes the army's enforce .... 
ment of discipline on the streets as being in contra-
vention of the Criminal Procedures Code (KUHAP); 
Inspecting ·the operation, Major-Gen. Kentot Har..-
seno said the measnres to enforce discipline would be · 
intensified, and · backed up by much harsher sanctions 
than hitherto. 
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TRADE UNIONS 
Free trade union makes headway 
The newly formed Serikat Buruh Merdeka Setiakawan, the 
Solidarity Free Trade Union, held its first congress on 15 
and 16 December 1990 in Jakarta, a month after the official 
launch. Attended by delegates from seventeen provinces, 
the congress announced the establishment of thirteen 
chapters and said the SBMS already has 30,000 to 40,000 
members. [For background to this important development, 
see TAPOL Bullf!tin, No 102, December 1990.) 
According toAFP [18 December], the congress elected its 
supreme executive council with H.J.C. Princen, the well-
known human rights activist, as general chairperson. It 
agreed to carry out a recruitment drive for new members 
and set itself the task of handling labour disputes. The 
chapters include unions in government-run companies, in 
the transport, energy, oil, gas and mining sectors as well as 
in manufacturing, trade and services. Princen said its aim 
was to defend workers' interests by improving their condi-
tions to meet the standards set by the International Labour 
Organisation (!LO). AFP also quoted the union's general 
secretary, Saut Aritonang, as saying it would stay in close 
contact with the ILO and other international labour groups 
if the government moved to prevent SBMS members from 
handling disputes. 
According to the Far Eastern Economic Review, Saut 
Aritonang is a former member of the government-run 
federation, the SPSI, who left the organisation "after faJJing 
out with the government over the union's transition from a 
federation of unions to a unitary organisation in 1985. Last 
May, he organised a protest march of 700 workers to the 
parliament in Jakarta, after which he was questioned by the 
security forces and later released." [PEER, 6 December 
1990] 
International support 
On the phone from Jakarta in late January, Princen told 
TAPOL that messages of support for the SBMS have been 
received from the ILO, from the main US union, AFUCIO 
and from the FNV in the Netherlands. 
A long-standing supporter of the restoration of human 
rights in Indonesia, Stan Newens, a Labour Member of the 
European Parliament, has written to the SBMS, expressing 
delight and congratulations. "The formation of the first free 
trade union in any society is an event of great importance, 
and I wish you well in your endeavours." 
The right to organise 
In a statement addressed to trade unions, human rights 
organisations and solidarity groups on 28 December 1990, 
TAPOL said: 
The emergence of the Solidarity Free Trade Union is 
important for several reasons. It is the first challenge to the 
oppressive corporatist model of wadah tunggal which 
allows. only a single organisation in any sector of society. 
The corporatist model has acted for years as the straitjacket 
making it impossible to have independent, democratic mass 
A booming electronic manufacturing industry paying meagre 
salaries to its workers. 
organisations in Indonesia. Just as important is the fact that 
SBMS, an initiative by human rights activists and former 
SPSI trade unionists, is the first genuine attempt since 1965 
to set up a trade union that can become truly representative 
of the workers. SBMS chair, Poncke Princen said, at a 
meeting between the union's board and several Indonesian 
MPs: 
" ... Our existence is not dependent on the taste, preferencts 
and recognition of the government, but on rec_ognitwn ·· by 
the workers. Recognition by the government is just a 
formality but recognition by the workers will be the 
legitimate basis of our existence. Our main aim is not to 
win 0;cceptance by and be registered at the Department of 
Labour; it is to register ourselves in the hearts of the 
workers. Our organisation is theirs and it is with them that 
we want to register ourselves" * 
STOP PRESS 
More arrests in East Timor 
Constancio Pinto, a teacher at Sao Jose school in Dili, was 
arrested in Dili on 25 January and taken for interrogation to 
the army chief of intelligen~, Lt.Colonel Gatot Purwanto. 
Two other people were arrested at about the same time in 
Maliana; one has been named as Marcus. 
Ten days earlier, Chico Dias Ximenes, an official on the 
staff of the governor's office was arrested. Sources say these 
arrests may be connected with documents captured during 
a recent armed clash between the army and Falintil. 
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ACEH 
Killings in Aceh condemned 
There is strong evidence of pressure on the Jakarta regime for its murderous policy in Aceh which has 
left hundreds, if not thousands, dead, and many people in detention where torture has been widespread. 
The government will try to counteract protest by conducting trials which were due to start in January. 
However, every effort should be made to force those responsible for the killings to account for their 
crimes. 
Official policy 
[nan interview with the Jakarta weekly Tempo [17 Novem-
ber 1990), Major-General Pramono, military commander of 
North Sumatra said many people had been killed in Aceh 
and that killings were occurring there every day. [n his own 
words - which have not since been retracted - the military 
commander made it clear that killing people suspected of 
being rebels was official policy. He said: 
I have told the people the important thing is, if you 
see a GPK, you should kill him. There's no need to investi-
gate. Just shoot him or knife him. People are forced to do 
this or that and if they don't want to, they are shot or get 
their throats slit. So I have instructed people to carry 
weapons, machetes or whatever. If you see a GPK, just kill 
him. [Tempo, 17 November 1990] 
[NB: 'GPK' stands for 'Gerombolan Pengacau Keamanan' 
or 'security disruptor gangs', the term officially used for 
Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, the Free Aceh Movement.] 
Asia Watch statement 
Major-General Djoko Pramono 
Commander of North Sumatra 
On 27 December 1990, the New York-based Asia Watch 
issued a lengthy statement on Aceh, along with a chrono-
logy of abuses nearly 20 pages long. In the words of Asia 
Watch: 
The abuses have been sparked by actions of an armed 
opposition group, the Acheh/Sumatra National Liberation 
Front, more commonly known as Aceh Merdeka or the Free 
Aceh Movement, and a heavy-handed response from the 
Indonesian military. The regional military commander, 
Major General HR. Pramono, boasted in July 1990 that 
the movement would be crushed by December. As of late 
November 1990, however, it was very much alive, and 
abuses were continuing. 
The combined death toll on both sides is estimated to be 
as high as 1, 000 with perhaps more killed by summary 
execution than by actual armed clashes; both sides have 
been responsible for atrocities. (The figure ofl,000 comes 
from an army doctor quoted in a November 25, 1990 
Reuters report.) Mass arrests of those suspected .. of 
supporting the movement have led almost invariably to 
torture and frequently to the disappearance of those 
detained. The regional military commander says informing 
families of arrests is "impractical. " Although bodies with 
gunshot or stab wounds continue to be found by roads, 
along rivers or in plantations in Aceh, no official inquests 
or investigations are conducted, and the military often 
refuses to allow the bodies to be buried in accordance with 
Islamic practices. There appear to be no procedures in 
place for conducting objective autopsies. International 
human rights organizations are not allowed officially to 
conduct fact-finding missions in Indonesia, let alone in 
Aceh, and humanitarian organizations cannot provide 
services in the area. Information is tightly controlled by the 
government. 
Asia Watch discusses at length the Free Aceh Movement 
and concludes: 
For all its organizational weaknesses, Aceh Merdeka has 
apparently succeeded in tapping deeply felt resentment 
against the Indonesian government, a feeling exacerbated 
by the perceived economic exploitation of the area by 
Western or Jakarta -based interests. If military abuses 
continue unabated, that resentment will only increase. 
Following a well-documented survey of human rights 
violations, Asia Watch makes the following demands 
(abbreviated here for reasons of space) calling on the 
Indonesian government to: 
1. issue a full and detailed list of all those arrested, 
detained and released since mid-1989 in connection with 
the violence in Aceh, and make these lists available in 
designated places so that the families of prisoners and 
missing persons can consult it. 
2. thoroughly investigate alJ reports of summary 
executions · and torture and make a public commitment to 
prosecute those responsible. 
3. implement the Indonesian Criminal Procedure Code 
(KUHAP) with respect to arrest and detention procedures 
and the rights of suspects. 
4. appoint an independent team of doctors to conduct 
thorough autopsies on all bodies of those who appear to 
have died unnatural deaths. 
5. allow international human rights and humanitarian 
organizations access to Aceh to visit prisons and conduct 
independent autopsies or other forensic investigations as t 
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ACEH 
needed. 
6. strictly monitor the activities of civil patrols, ensuring 
participation is not forced, that the patrols are not encoura-
ged to engage in arrests or the use of force against civilians. 
7. discipline any member of the security forces, including 
commanding officers, who urge citizens to take the law into 
their own hands or exhort others to violence . • 
8. ensure that all those arrested have immediate access to 
lawyers as guaranteed by the Criminal Procedure Code. 
9. lift all restrictions, formal or informal, on the flow of 
information to and from and about Aceh. 
T APOL condemns Aceh massacre 
In a statement on 18 December 1990, TAPOL strongly 
condemned this latest wave of killings by the Suharto 
regime. It called on governments and people everywhere to 
exert pressure on the Suharto government to put a stop to 
the slaughter. It called on human rights organisations in 
Indonesia and abroad to send observers to Aceh. Western 
governments should send officials to Aceh to assess the 
scale of the massacre, it said. An appeal was also made to 
the European Parliament to adopt an emergency resolution 
calling for an end to the slaughter. 
Finally, said TAPOL: "Those responsible for the killings 
must be brought to justice. Since this cannot be done in 
Indonesia, an International Tribunal on Crimes against 
Humanity should be convened to investigate the abuses in 
Aceh and hold the Suharto regime responsible for its 
campaign of death and mass intimidation." 
TAPOL called on solidarity organisations throughout the 
world to call on their own governments to exert pressure on 
Jakarta to halt the atrocities in Aceh and to allow indepen-
dence investigations to take place. 
British government "deeply concerned" 
Replying to a letter from TAPOL, the Earl of Caithness. 
Minister of State at the Foreign Office, said the British 
Government was "deeply concerned at the allegations of 
widespread killings and torture." Although officials from the 
British embassy in Jakarta visited Aceh periodically in 
1990, would continue to do so and the embassy was 
continuation from page 7 
Other members of the group have received heavy sen-
tences: Moh. Achwan life imprisonment, Abdul Kadir Ali 
al Habsyi a younger brother of the defendant, 20 years, 
Achmad Muladawila, 20 years, and Abdul Kadir Baraja 15 
years. 
Hussein al Habsyi maintained his defiant stance and 
created a stir in court when he loudly protested against the 
charges of the public prosecutor. "I am disgusted", he 
shouted, "I do not even know whether the prosecutor is a 
major and the judge a colonel!" The defendant was 
removed from the courtroom while Prosecutor Syakranie 
continued to read the charges and demanded a death 
sentence as the defendant had not shown any remorse for 
his deeds and in fact defied the court procedures. 
In the next court session, Hussein insisted on his inno-
cence and stated that neither the prosecutor nor the 
witnesses could give evidence to prove his involvement in 
the bombings. His defence plea was a mixture of sermon 
and an attack on the nature of his trial. His statement 
exchanging information with EC partners, the lette.r said, "ft 
is exceedingly difficult to obtain accurate information about 
events in Aceh. We have already drawn our concern to the 
attention of the Indonesian authorities and will continue to 
take suitable opportunities to do so." 
Referring to the statement by Pramono calling on people 
to "kill GPK", the letter said it understood "that Pramono 
has been reprimanded for his comments. The army com-
mander has publicly criticised 'aggressive and violent' army 
tactics in dealing with social problems. This is believed to 
allude to Aceh." 
Despite these assurances, there is no evidence that the 
licence to kill pronounced by Pramono has been revoked. 
Pramono's public pronouncement has evidently been a 
serious embarrassment to the regime and to those, like the 
British government, who support Indonesia. If, as the 
British government says, it is "exceedingly difficult to 
obtain accurate information", the need for an independent 
inquiry is all the more urgent. 
Government's response 
In early January, the governor of Aceh, Ibrahim Hasan, 
claimed in Jakarta that military operations in Aceh had been 
"successfully concluded" and "security had been restored". 
Two weeks later, Air Vice Marshall Teddy Rusdi, 
assistant for policy and planning to the armed forces 
commander, summoned journalists to describe Asia Watch's 
charges as "completely baseless!'. "I don't know why they 
are talking about thousands killed by the armed forces. We 
are talking about only 20 or 30 killed," he said, alleging 
that "the rebels were mostly responsible for the deaths of 
civilians". [Reuters and BBC World Service, 15 January 
1991.) Since Indonesia faces no perceived threat from 
outside the country, the armed forces could concentrate on 
dealing with internal threats, in Aceh, Irian Jaya (West 
Papua) and East Timor. "Our policy is to win people over 
from their sympathies with the guerrillas through propa-
ganda and psychological warfare. I give you my word, the 
military is not going to use its rifles." 
Clearly such assurances can satisfy no-one. The Aceh 
atrocities are certain to be raised at the February-March 
1991 meeting of the UN Human Rights Commission in 
Geneva and at the European Parliament. ~ 
included quotations from the Qur'an, the sonnets of 
Shakespeare, and from Western political scientists. Hussein 
declared that he was ready to be executed and would not 
make an appeal or ask for clemency. 
Hussein Al Habsyi on his prayer mat, facing the judges 
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MUSLIM TRIALS 
Petition to reverse death sentence 
A petition is circulating in a number of cities in Indonesia to call on the Indonesian government not 
to proceed with the execution of Azhar bin Mohammad Safar, sentenced to death in 1982. 
Appeal to Supreme Court turned down 
Azhar bin Mohammad Safar, 46 years, was found guilty of 
being a member of the so-called Imron Group which was 
allegedly involved in an attack on a police station in 
Cicendo, West Java and the hijack of a Garuda aircraft, 
'Woyla', in 1981. 
Azhar himself, not one of the hijackers, was sentenced to 
death by the South Jakarta district court in 1982. The first 
to be sentenced to death in this case was Imron, the alleged 
leader of the group, who was executed on 28 March 1983. 
Azhar's appeal to the High Court was turned down in 
September 1985 and an appeal to the Supreme Court was 
also turned down. On 8 November 1988, Azhar was told his 
appeal for presidential clemency had also been rejected. 
His execution, scheduled for 14 December 1988, was 
postponed just ten hours before he was to be put to death, 
following his last minute appeal for a judicial review of his 
case by the Supreme Court. This final bid to the Supreme 
Court has now been rejected and the decision upholding the 
death penalty has been passed to the Bandung District 
Court and the Jakarta Attorney-General's Office which will 
be in charge of Azhar's execution. 
The 'Woyla', on an internal flight, landed in Bangkok 
under instructions of the hijackers. It was · subsequently 
stormed by Indonesian elite units under the command of 
General Benny Murdani, then .chief of army intelligence and 
two years later, commander-in-chief of the armed foJ:ces, 
acting on instructions from General Yoga Soegomo, chief 
of BAK.IN (intelligence coordination agency). Three of the 
five hijackers and two crew members were killed during the 
assault; the other two hijackers, captured alive, have never 
been . accounted for; they were dead before they left 
Bangkok. 
The heavy-handed raid was acclaimed by both the CIA 
and the MI6 as a successful example in the fight to combat 
terrorism. [Letters of congratulations are reproduced in the 
autobiography of Yoga Soegomo, published last year.] 
Link with Iran? 
A press report of the rejection of Azhar's last appeal to the 
Supreme Court claims that lnuon's group was planning to 
assist the Iranian Government by hijacking the airplane on 
which the Iraqi minister of oil was traveJJing; the alleged 
intention, it is now being said, was to exchange him for an 
Iranian minister then being held hostage by the Iraq. This 
is the first mention ever of an Iran-Iraq link. 
Petition to revoke the death sentence 
In a petition dated 11 January 1991, human rights workers, 
students, lawyers and NGO activists have appealed strongly 
to the government not to go ahead with the execution of 
Azhar because the death penalty does not comply with the 
principles of humanity. Moreover the concept of Indonesian 
law is based on educating off enders, not on revenge. 
The petitioners recalled President Suharto's meeting with 
Nelson Mandela last autumn when he caJJed for the repeal 
of the emergency laws in South Africa and for the imme-
diate release of all political prisoners there. 
The petition calls for a review of Azhar's death sentence, 
for . the creation of genuine political openings for the 
political aspirations of the people, for the repeal of the 
Anti-Subversion Law and the immediate release of all 
political prisoners. J:1.. 
The Al Habsyi trial 
Another 'heavy' Muslim case is the trial of Husein bin Ali al Habsyi, accused of leading several 
terrorist and subyersive actions. The defendant is the last to be put on trial from the so-called Malang 
group; the others were tried and sentenced in 1986. 
Death sentence demanded 
Hussein al Habsyi, a blind lay preacher, has long been 
known for his strong Muslim convictions and defiance of 
the Pancasila, the Indonesian state doctrine. During the first 
trial session in mid November, he refused to take the 
defendant's chair and instead sat on the floor on a sajadah, 
a prayer mat. The charges against Husein are grave; he is 
charged as the leader of a group who blew up several · 
stupas round the Borobudur monument, bombed two 
churches in Malang and masterminded the tragic grenade 
explosion on a bus travelJing to Bali. The other alleged 
leader of the group, Ibrahim alias Djawad, is still on the run 
and has reportedly fled to Itan. All these incidents occurred 
inlitte 1984 and early 1985. Husein evaded arrest until 17 
November 1989 when he was captured in Garut, We.st Java. 
continued on page 6 
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Indonesia: Muslims on trial 
availaihl.e .. from TAPOL 
TAPOL Bulletin No. 103, February 1991 7 
POLITICS 
Impressions from a visit 
to Indonesia 
In November I spent several weeks in Indonesia meeting groups and individual~ who .are prepa~~ng, 
each in their own way, for the post-Suharto era. The diversity of groups, developing their own political 
practice and tradition, will provide the basis for a free and democratic Indonesia. 
East Timor 
An interesting development is the emergence of East Timor 
as a political issue for the present generation of student, 
human rights and political activists. East Timor has always 
been a complex and muddled issue for the older dissidents. 
The older anti-Suharto generation used a variety of justifi-
cations to support annexation. It was either that "East Timor 
is an ABRI project but they made a mess of it", implying 
that if they were in power, they would have done it better. 
Or: "For strategic reasons we will not raise the East Timor 
issue", avoiding confrontation with ABRI and putting the 
issue on ice. Much worse are the nationalistic, anti-Suharto 
groups who insist that ABRI should clamp down harder on 
the Timorese. Very few see East Timor as an Indonesian 
colony; stilJ worse, hardly anyone from the older generation 
has put East Timor high on their list of priorities. The issue 
remained buried in silence, to be mentioned only when 
someone from abroad asked questions. 
In the transitional generation of oppositionists of the 
sixties and seventies, the understanding about East Timor 
has been more fundamental and far-reaching. GeneraJJy 
speaking, they accept that the East Timorese have the right 
to determine their political destiny, and are eager to foJJow 
events in East Timor. But it seems there is a gentleman's 
agreement to deal with East Timor only when Suharto is 
removed or steps down. 
There is a quantum leap to the position of many young 
activists. The defence pleas of Ammarsyah and Beathor 
Suryadi, publicly raised the East Timor issue. East Timor is 
regarded as a place where human rights are trampled 
underfoot. Many new activists do not regard the unitary 
state of Indonesia as sacred. The struggle for democracy 
and for human rights is regarded as more important than 
rigid views about nation states. 
In several encounters with this generation of activists, we 
had fruitful discussions. The way they have integrated East 
Timor into their thinking is encouraging. Basic information 
on East Timor circulates and books and reports published 
by Tapol, Amnesty International and Asia Watch are widely 
read. Discussions about East Timor were therefore about 
matters like the present state of armed resistance and the 
underground network in the cities. Activists are eager to 
circulate material on the struggle in East Timor to a wider 
public. It is very apparent that the enduring and dedicated 
struggle of the East Timorese is a source of inspiration for 
a growing number of people in Indonesia. The difficulties 
in campaigning about East Timor in the cities of Java 
should not be overlooked. There are no political platforms 
on whicb to raise this issue. But from my observations and 
contacts, there is good reason to believe that gradually, 
through a slow political process, East Timor will emerge as 
an important issue in the struggle for democracy. As some 
people said to me: "Indonesia can never become. a democ-
racy until it solves the East Timor problem, until 
East Timor has exercised its right to self-determination". 
And once people acquire knowledge and political under-
standing about East Timor, the next step forward, under-
standing other disputed areas like West Papua, Maluku or 
Aceh wilJ follow. 
The ex-tapols 
There is an atmosphere of change in Indonesia. A lot of 
certainties and holy shrines are being toppled and replaced 
by new movements, new ideas, new individuals. President 
Suharto shuffles and reshuffles the pack and the outcome is 
uncertain. He might even faJJ victim to his own reshuffling. 
But in the midst of all these changes, one huge group of 
people remain in almost exactly the same situation, the 1.7 
million - or is it 1.4 million? or 1.9 million? the govern-
ment figure uften changes - ex-tapols (former tahanan 
politik or ex political prisoners. Since their release in the 
late seventies, all kinds of restrictions and controJs have 
been imposed upon them. These are the victims of more 
than a quarter of a century of discrimination. 
Ten years since the last untried tapoJs were released, 
hardJy anything has changed; some restrictions/regulations 
have been replaced by others and the ex-tapols still have 
no rights at all, only a loadful of duties. With few excep-
tions who told me, "We have nothing to Jose," and try to 
develop a life as a citizen with rights and duties, the 
majority still live in miserable socio-economic conditions. 
Many remain dependent on the grace and charity · of friends 
and relatives. Those who manage to acquire a job lack the 
8ecurity and guarantees, however flimsey, of other citizens. 
Keeping a job is difficult as the spectre of anti-communism 
is arbitrarily used to dismiss ex-tapols, referred to as 'ET', 
over and over again. Local district military officers or 
bureaucrats take advantage of their skiJis to do aIJ kinds of 
odd jobs, free of charge. 
To raise their voice in protest will only worsen things, 
provoking retaliation by the authorities. Because of their 
status as ETs, which is marked clearly for all to see on their 
identity cards, it is hardly possible for them to function 
properly in society. Indonesia under Suharto has created a 
new underclass. 
By contrast with the growing interest in East Timor the 
plight of the ETs has, in the last decade, lost its momentum. 
With the exception of one or two charitable bodies which 
wo~k qui~t.Iy, far f~om the limelight, to help the ETs and 
the'!. families, the. issue has been lost sight of by all the 
pobhcal groups with whom I came in contact. 'f. 
Liem Soei Liong 
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'RIBAL PEOPLE 
Death in the Forest 
We summarise here a rare account, from the political 
weekly Tempo, of the devastating impact upon tribal people 
of the invasion of their forest land by forest concessionaires 
and transmigrants. It is frightening to note that although 
about 75 per cent of the tribe are reported to have died 
over the last decade, it is only now that anything, to our 
knowledge, has been reported in the press. While in the 
Tempo article, the reporter reflei:ts concern for the tribal 
people, he is unable to understand that a lifestyle that is 
'normal' for Javanese newcomers is totally foreign to people 
who have inhabited the forests for centuries. 
Members of the Kubu tribe who Jive some distance to the 
north of Tebingtinggi, South Sumatra are dying fast. The 
vilJage head of Tebingtinggi Kelumpang, sub-district 
Rawas llir believes that during October and November this 
year a hundred members of the tribe may have died. 
According to records kept by the Socia] Affairs Service, 
the tribe which had about 12,000 members in 1979 has now 
dwindled to 2,642. 
An official said that whereas two years ago, tribe mem-
bers could be found in the area close to Tebingtinggi, they 
have a11 now disappeared into the forest of Aer Hitam 
which can only be reached by bus from Kubuklinggau, 
capita] of the sub-district of Musirawas, and then a 75 km 
walk through the forest and across rivers. 
The Socia] Affairs programme of setting up settlement 
sites for the Kubu tribe has clearly failed. One site where 
a hundred families were re-settled, was found to have only 
ten Kubu families Jeft when the district chief, Nang Ali 
SoJichin visited the site on 6 December. The remainder of 
the site was occupied by families from Java even though 
conditions there are not as favourable as at transmigration 
sites. Whereas transmigrants are given facilities free for one 
or two years, the tribes-people get free facilities for only 
six months. The tribes-people also cannot adapt to the form 
of agriculture promoted at these sites. Only the 
transmigrants can adjust to the 'normal' life-style. Even 
'trivial' (sic) things like wearing clothes are out of the 
question for them. 
Although the Social Affairs Department chief is reported 
as "frankly admitting" his concern about this situation, he 
is quoted as saying he does not understand why' the tribes-
-people are dying off. But Tempo quotes a member of the 
tribe, Maropah, as saying that forest concessionaires have 
invaded their land massively since the 1970s. According 
figures compiled by Tempo, of the 1,2 milJion hectares of 
protected and productive forest in the district of Tebing-
tinggi, 636;000 or more than half, have already been 
cleared. Another 40,000 hectares have been occupied by 
transmigrants. In addition, 120,000 hectares are covered by 
rubber plantations and 27,750 hectares are used to grow 
rice. In less than two decades, only a third of the forest ]and 
in the region is left. 
The forests which provided a habitat for the tribes-people 
and their source of food have hugely diminished in size. 
Wild animals like boars, deer and monkeys have also been 
driven out, leaving only cats and dogs. But the Kubu people 
do not, by tradition, eat such animals. Recently they have 
started eating rice, having lost their own traditional staple 
food, but because they are unable to find enough rattan to 
selJ in the market - rattan stands are also disappearing fast 
- they cannot earn enough money to buy rice. Some 
officials claim that the Kubu people have now resorted to 
cannibalism but one official strongly denied this, saying 
that they have no history of cannibalism. 
The district chief, Nang Ali Solichin is reported as "not 
remaining quiet" at reports of the high death rate. This 
month, he went into the interior in search of information 
from the tribes-people themselves. "This situation must not 
be a11owed to continue; the truth should not be concealed." 
He said that the task of saving the Kubu tribe was just as 
urgent as saving the elephants in Lampung. [Summarised 
from Tempo. Date: 15 December 1990.] * 
Down to Earth is a quarterly news service on development issues 
+ forests + mining + tribal people • pollution • land disputes t 
+ transmigration • nuclear power • ... and more. 
To view a trial issue of Down to Earth write to: Down to Earth, c/o 34 
Vicarage Grove, London SES 7LY, UK. Email: gn:dte 
Down to Earth is a project of the Asia-Pacmc Peoples' Environment 
Network, 43 Salween Road, 10050 Penang, Malaysia. 
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WEST PAPUA 
Mecky Salosa on trial 
Leading OPM guerrilla Meclcy Salosa who was handed over to the Indonesian authorities by PNG in 
July 1990, is now on trial in Jayapura, West Papua. He is charged with subversion and could face the 
death penalty. 
The trial started on Tuesday, 8 January at the Jayapura 
district court, but as Meclcy Salosa appeared in court 
without a defence lawyer, the trial was postponed until 14 
January. The prosecutor did not read out the indictment. 
According to a report in Kompas, the defendant sat calmly 
in court while eight key witnesses sat listening to the 
proceedings. Asked by the presiding judge whether he 
wished to have a defence lawyer, he said: "Yes, but would 
you find me one, please." 
Salosa is accused of influencing others to join the OPM 
to go into the bush and fight against the Indonesian 
government; of abusing and inciting people; and of 
undermining development in the Indonesian-PNG border 
region. He is also accused of involvement in the attack on 
Arso IV transmigration site in Jayapura district, in which 14 
transmigrants were killed. 
Kompas says items seized from the accused included 12 
'loops' bullets, an English-language Bible, two mauser 
rifles, a 'kiroop' weapon and a 'loops' rifle magazine, but 
fails to mention that it was PNG, not Indonesia that did the 
seizing. [Kompas 10 January 1991] 
Before the trial was announced, Salosa is reported to have 
been tortured. The Times of PNG quoted reports received 
from an OPM contact which said Mr Salosa had "very sore 
cheeks and several teeth had fallen out due to heavy 
bashing and being starved. Nails from both his fingers and 
toes were pulled out." This was denied by a PNG Border 
Administration official who said it contradicted the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)'s recent 
report that Salosa's condition is okay. [Times of PNG, 15 
November, 1990]. 
Indonesian army pursues non-existent fugitive 
The Indonesian authorities say they are searching for Swiss 
pilot Theo Frey, who they suspect of smuggling 
ammunition into West Papua for the OPM. A spokesman at 
the Attorney General's office said Theo Frey landed his 
Cessna plane in Merauke on July 27, 1990. The plane was 
carrying ammunition, cameras and documents on the OPM, 
according to the Indonesian Antara News Service, quoting 
the official. "We are stilJ searching for him and trying to 
prevent him from leaving the country ... " said the 
spokesman. (Reuter January 7, 1991] 
According to the Indonesian daily Jawa Pos's version, the 
spokesman, Soeprijadi, said five bullets had been found in 
the aircraft - [hardly a 'supply']. 
Soeprijadi said the case dossier and incriminating 
evidence was turned over to the Irian Jaya High Prosecutor 
by the Trikora Regional Command on December 28. The 
Irian Jaya High Prosecutor has appealed to the public to 
give information concerning the 'fugitive's whereabouts. If 
not found, Frey would be tried in absentia, he said. (Jawa 
Pas 8 January, 1991]. 
Meanwhile, back in St Gallen, Switurland, the 'fugitive' 
poured scorn on the Indonesian accusations. The former 
mission pilot, now OPM representative in Switzerland, 
explained to Associated Press he could not possibly have 
delivered ammunition to the OPM as he had not been out 
of Switzerland for a year and a half. 
Frey says he would willingly stand trial for smuggling if 
the trial was fair, and if he had the opportunity to expose 
human rights abuses in West Papua. [Werdenberg u. 
Obertogenburger, 15 January, 1991] 
Establishing 'outside support'? 
So what is Indonesia playing a,t? The military cannot have 
forgotten that Theo Frey did indeed fly a plane into West 
Papua from Australia, but in July 1989, not 1990. They 
know - and indeed it was reported in the Indonesian press 
- that he was arrested shortly afterwards, for illegal entry 
at the Papua New Guinea border and sentenced to two 
months hard labour. 
Frey himself thinks that the reports about him are being 
used to justify renewed military action against the OPM in 
the Merauke region. 
It is also likely that by playing up the ammunition 
delivery issue, the Indonesian authorities are intending to 
give credence to the claim that the OPM is supported from 
outside the country. "It may well be that Theodor happens 
to be a S~iss; all of. this is being investigated by the 
Jayapura High Prosecution," said Soeprijadi, implying there 
may be something more sinister about Frey than merely 
being Swiss. This attempt to show that the OPM enjoys 
outside support is in line with moves from the top of the 
Indonesian armed forces to try to prove that there are the 
external connections with liberation movements in East 
Timor and Aceh. 
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Border collaboration arouses ire 
Increased co-operation between ABRl and the PNG 
Defence Forces [See TAPOL Bulletin No 102) has not met 
with approval in all quarters. [n December last year, Sir Pita 
Lus, MP for Maprik,. was reported to be furious over 
arrangements for joint military exercises and civic 
programmes with Indonesia. He said he feared Indonesia 
would use the opportunity to spy on PNG and study the 
terrain for ulterior motives and said he would not allow 
such programmes to be conducted in_Maprik. [Post Courier 
14 December, 1990) 
An angry Courier reader wrote: "Almost 90% of the 
Melanesians in Papua New Guinea support our brothers' 
struggle for independence. [t is simply unjustified when we 
support the Kanaks in New Caledonia and the East 
Timorese, yet do not support the Melanesians in West 
Papua." [28 November 1990) 
WEST PAPUA 
Meanwhile, more co-operation is on the cards: PNG's 
police minister announced in December that senior PNG 
police officers would be sent to Indonesia for training in 
Indonesian police command colleges on the invitation of 
ABRl commander General Try Sutrisno, who was visiting 
P1:1"~· [Post Courier 17 December, 1990) Deputy prime 
m1mster Ted Diro, is widely believed to have held a secret 
meeting_ ~ith . Indonesian Defence Minister General Benny 
Mu~dam m Smgapore late last year, although this has been 
demed by PNG prime minister, Rabbi Namaliu. 
• • • 
The .six hos~ages held hostage in November by OPM 
guemllas at m PNG [see Tapo/ Bulletin no. 103 J were 
released unharmed after 12 days. -{{ 
EAST TIMOR 
Tim or oil accord sparks row in Jakarta 
The Timor Gap Treaty has sparked a bitter controversy in 
Indonesia. The row completely overlooked the illegality of 
the robbers' pact between Indonesia and Australia to share 
the spoils of Indonesia's violent annexation of East Timor, 
but it did draw attention to the phenomenal importance both 
parties attach to the oil reserves hidden beneath the Timor 
Sea. The prospect that the controversy might delay ratifica-
tion led both Jakarta and Canberra to act quickly to end the 
dispute. As Parliament was about to vote on ratification, 
Australia's Mining Minister, Alan Griffiths, flew into 
Jakarta and used every opportunity to praise the agreement. 
The oil-rich seabed largely explains Jakarta's motivation 
in annexing East Timor. Some geologists believe that these 
oil reserves are at least the equivalent of oil reserves in the 
Middle East. Australian companies were aware of this 
potential back in 1975 and considered that the Suharto 
regime was the best one to do business with; hence 
Australia's support for Jakarta's annexation plans so early on 
in the dispute. For Indonesia too, the desire to grab this oil 
must have been a major, if not the prime, consideration in 
its decision to move against Fretilin and the people of East 
Timor. 
Call for postponement swept aside 
The row broke out when the Treaty was submitted to the 
Indonesian Parliament for ratification. The former Rector of 
Gadjah Mada University, Dr Herman Johannes, a leading 
physicist who has all along been an outspoken critic of the 
Treaty, argued that Australia will enjoy far more benefit 
from the accord than Indonesia, He said the only 'fair' 
share-out of the proceeds would be 50:50 throughout the 
region. [t is ludicrous, he argued, for Indonesia to be 
allowed a mere 1.6 per cent of the profits from the most 
southerly Zone C, probably the richest part of the oil-field. 
The 90 percent share alloted to Indonesia from the northerly 
Zone B was no compensation as it was doubtful whether 
this zone contained any oil at all. 
He was particularly critical that the two sides had agreed 
to set aside for 40 years their dispute over the sea border 
between Australia and East Timor. Our geologists, he said, 
believe that the stretch is a continuous continental shelf· , 
under the 1982 Law of the Sea Treaty, the border should be 
equidistant from both countries and resources shared 50:50. 
Hence, ratification should be postponed 2 or 3 years, to 
await Australia's ratification of the Law of the Sea Treaty 
when its terms will become applicable to the Timor Sea. 
Dr Johannes' testimony to parliamentary spelling out his 
objections struck a nationalist cord, and many MPs, who 
usually . rubber-stamp government proposals, started 
questioning the Treaty. Things came to such a pass that 
Foreign Minister Ali Alatas sent two senior officials to 
Yogyakarta to persuade Dr Johannes to cool it. But the 
highly-respected academic made no concessions, saying he 
could not understand why the government was so unwilling 
continued on page 27 
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EAST TIMOR 
15 years of Indonesian rule 
15 years after the Indonesian invasion on 7 December 1975, East Timor displays all the hallmarks of 
a colonised territory: a strong military presence, a colonial administration and massive population 
control. On the other hand, there are many forms of resistance, creating immense difficulties for the 
military authorities in Jakarta and giving headaches to Indonesian diplomats. 
The style and emphasis of Indonesian colonial rule may 
change from time to time, but one thing never changes: 
East Timor is an army project. In 1976 Suharto illegally 
incorporated East Timor as Indonesia's 27th province but 
the contrast with the islands of Indonesia is striking. The 
military presence in East Timor is patently obvious. 
Emphasis on security makes life very difficult for the East 
Timorese. 
Brief military history 
As with many military adventures, the architects of the 
invasion, generals Benny Murdani, Ali Murtopo, Pangga-
bean and Suharto, expected to wrap up East Timor in a few 
days, but the huge Indonesian invasion only seized control 
of the capital Dili and other towns while the countryside 
remained in the hands of Fretilin. Together with the 
guerrilla forces, the majority of the population fled into the 
mountains. It took time for the Indonesian army to lick their 
wounds and rebuild their weapons arsenal. In September 
1977, the army under its new commander, General Yusuf, 
started his extermination and annihilation campaign. The 
main aim was to destroy the backbone of the resistance and 
force the population into the lowland areas. Aerial bom-
bardment and massive troop movements encirded the 
centres of the resistance in the mountains. 
General Yusuf inspecting troops in East Timor in 1978 
This savage campaign which lasted ti11 March 1979 had 
a devastating effect; tens of thousands were killed and the 
agricultural system was destroyed, causing widespread 
famine and disease. The East Timorese were forced to leave 
their shelters and came under the control of the Indonesians. 
The Indonesian army continued its policy of exterminating 
the guerilla forces while herding the population in resettle-
ment camps. Although it inflicted a terrible blow on 
Fretilin, the resistance reorganised itself, re-emerging in the 
1980s under the leadership of Shanana Gusmao. 
In the early 1980s, a different kind of military operation 
was launched, drawing East Timorese into war operations. 
These included using East Timorese in army battalions or 
paramilitary units and using the pagar betis (fence of legs) 
strategy of conscripting large numbers of civilians to move 
ahead of Indonesian troops, encircling an area where 
guerrillas are thought to be hiding. As the noose tightens, 
the guerrillas are forced into the open and captured or shot. 
In May 1981 a nationwide fence of legs operation was 
launched; code-named Operasi Keamanan or Security 
Operation, military circles in Jakarta caJJed this perang 
terachir or the final war. This operation also had a devas-
tating effect on the population. VirtuaJJy aJJ men aged 15 to 
50 were forced to join, leaving their families without food 
and abandoning crops for many months. Although the army 
later admitted that the operation had failed to obliterate the 
guerillas, the fence of legs operation was later used over 
and over again, though on a much smaJJer scale. 
Later in the eighties, military strategy gradually shifted. 
Instead of using territorial troops {battalions from different 
parts of Indonesia), the army opted for counter-insurgency. 
In 1983-84, after the coJJapse of peace talks between 
Colonel Purwanto and Fa/inti! commander Shanana Gusm-
ao, the army launched its last 'old-style' offensive, using 
everything - warships, tanks, airplanes, mortars, cannons 
and large numbers of territorial troops. 
From 1986-87, the switch to counter-insurgency which 
Benny Murdani describes as 'territorial guerilla warfare'. 
became apparent. Elite troops with special training in 
counter-insurgency warfare are used instead of territorial 
troops. A smaller number of troops are used in we11-
p1anned operations lasting for a fixed period of time. It 
involves a wide dispersal of forces, functioning in smaU 
units. In 1988 a larger scale counter-insurgency · attack was 
launched. Since 1989, this has become the main strategy, 
being constantly refined and nowadays using Timorese 
counter-insurgency troops to fight East Timorese guerillas. 
At every stage of the war, Falintil has adopted strategies 
to correspond to the changes in the Indonesian strategy. The 
latest strategy has created difficulties for the gueri11as; the 
heightened mobility of army units keeps the resistance 
c?nstantly on _the move. Larger battles rarely occur as both 
~ides operate ~ sma11 units. These days, guerriJJa ambushes 
mvo]ve a maximum of ten well-prepared guerilJas. 
Parallel population control 
The different periods of the war and military strategy has 
affe~ted ~he ~rmy's strategy for controJJing the population. 
Social. scientists from Gadjah Mada University in Yogya-
karta m a report last year about conditions in East Timor 
n~ted what they called a continuance of a war situation 
with society sti11 Jiving in a trauma. 
The way the population has been contro11ed reflects the 
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differen~ stages of the war. In the early period, the 
Indonesi~ns only c~ntrolled the towns while the population 
stayed with the resistance. Only after the miJitary campaign 
of 1977-1979 did the population come under Indonesian 
co.ntrol. These years of war brought terrible devastation: a 
thud of the population was killed directly or indirectly 
~ecause of the war while an estimated 80% of the popula-
~ion were uprooted. The distraught population were herded 
mto daerah pemukiman or resettlement areas some 145 of 
which were set up. The hastily created C:.mps had on 
average 2,000 people; the sites were chosen at random 
mostly wher~ food production was hardly possible. ' 
The. key aim was to separate the population from the 
guemllas, but. they failed to for several reasons: having 
been set up m a haphazard fashion, they were easily 
penetrated by the reorganised guerrilla forces. Conditions 
were so deplorable that inhabitants either choose to defect 
and join the resistance or become part of the underground 
network in the camps. The army was compelled to rethink 
the population policy and, in line with the new military 
strategy o~ involving Timorese in the war, new camps were 
created, situated along new asphalt roads built by the Ind~nesian army to .serve several purposes. Army strategists 
reahsed that secunty would be better served if people 
comin~ from the same village were regrouped together. The 
new sites were better chosen and in some instances it 
became possible for the population to start growing food 
again by tending small vegetable plots. 
Limited transmigration 
In the mid eighties some desa teladan or model villages 
were developed as 'showcases', by East Timorese and 
transmigrants from East Java, Central Java, Yogyakarta and 
Bali. This lll:odel. was intended to herald the start of large-
scale transmigration of Javanese and Balinese to East Timor 
but for a variety of reasons, the scheme collapsed: most 
Javanese and Balinese, having heard about the grave 
situatio~ in East Timor, were not attracted to go there; the 
East T1morese, having suffered badly at the hands the 
Indonesians and lost land and property, did not take kindly 
to the newcomers. At the same time transmigration became 
a target of criticism from inside and outside the country and 
the Jakarta authorities had to put a brake on the programme. 
But there has been large-scale spontaneous migration of 
Indonesians into East Timor. Petty traders from East Nusa 
Tenggara, South Sulawesi and Buton have found their way 
to East Timor. Together with civil servants, they account 
for an estimated 35,000 Indonesians. East Timorese are 
bitter about this influx. It is deeply offensive to see new-
comers nudging their way in, gaining control of the admin-
istration, running the schools, shops and market-places and 
causing urban populations to soar. Indonesians from all 
walks of life, soldiers, teachers, construction workers, 
cobblers, street hawkers and tailors, have moved in, 
transforming life in towns like Dili, Baucau, Lospalos, 
Viqueque, Manatuto, Ermera, Ainaro and Liquisa. Unem-
ployment has risen while those who get jobs are mostly 
Indonesians. 
In the late eighties, a third wave of population upheaval 
oc.curred, allowing groups of people to return and rebuild 
their abandoned villages. The authorities realised that the 
original village sites were the best places to live and 
produce food. Moreover, having villages scattered in the 
interior would serve a security objective. At the same time, 
an effort was made to develop a plantation economy by 
requiring people to grow cash crops like coconuts, kapok 
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and boost the yield of the famous Timor coffee. This new 
population policy reflected the two-pronged strategy; the 
counter-insurgency method of using elite forces, while the 
East Timor Wiradharma military command initiated a 
'smiling policy', Operasi Senyum. As early as 1986 Colonel 
Yunus Yosfiah, Wiradharma military commander, said the 
best way to cope with armed resistance was to improve the 
living standards of the people. The territorial soldiers were 
ins_tructed to set up 'model gardens' in the new villages, 
build fish ponds and so on. The present commander 
. . , 
Bngadier-General Rudy Warouw, has revived this approach 
but it is hardly likely to improve overall conditions. 
In 1989, the security requirements of the Pope's visit led 
to special operations commanded by Colonel Prabowo 
which earned him a terrible reputation for brutality. Nor 
could 'smiling' be said to be characteristic of Colonel 
Mulyadi's term as commander of the Wiradharma command 
up to the end of 1989. 
With all its chops and changes, Indonesia's strategy of 
population control remains integral to the overall military 
strategy of ha~ka~rata, the concept of territorial manage-
ment and temtonal warfare. The new villages may be an 
improvement on the earlier resettlement camps but they are 
integral to the military strategy of control. Nor has freedom 
of movement be restored. The security approach of the 
Indonesian army continues to be the dominant factor. 
The. East Timo.rese are as ever unwilling to cooperate in 
anythmg emanatmg from the Indonesians. Deep distrust of 
the Indonesian military persists while the arrogant topdown 
approach of the average Indonesian soldier can only widen 
the cleavage. 
The colonial administration 
After much high-level confusion in Jakarta following a call 
by Governor Mario Carrascalao for the region to be 'opened 
up', it was decided at the end of 1988 to grant East Timor 
equal status with Indonesian provinces, thus acknowledging 
the former special status of East Timor. Two years on East 
T.imor has r~tained most of its special features, the' only 
difference ~emg a small trickle of tourists (1,190 in 1989, 
and 1,223 m 1990). The main feature is still the militaryt 
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structure. Until December 1989, it was run as a special 
military command, Komando Operasi Keamanan Timor 
Timur (Koopskam TimTim) , Operational Security Command 
for East Timor, but now it has a different name Komando 
Pelaksanaan Ketertiban Operasi Timor Timur (Kolakskop 
TimTim) or Command for Implementing Order in East 
Timor. Till 1989, the special command existed side by side 
with the East Timor military command, operating under a 
different command structure, subordinated to army head-
quarters in Jakarta, not to the regional military command in 
Bali. With Kolakskop, both commands seem to be fused 
under one military commander who concurrently holds both 
command positions. This special command structure has top 
priority and possesses all the most advanced and best-
equipped material and personnel. 
Fa/inti/ guerillas in 1983 
From top to bottom, the civilian provincial administration 
is integrated into the military and police structure. For 
instance, the districts are governed by bodies called tripida, 
or triple regional leadership composed of the local military 
commander, the local police chief and the district head. The 
two uniformed chiefs are Indonesians while the district 
chief is usually a Timorese. On top of this, the Timorese 
district chief usually functions in tandem with an army 
inteUigence officer who handles administrative duties while 
keeping a dose watch on the Timorese official. Any 
Timorese in a position of leadership, including Governor 
Carrascalao, has an Indonesian military minder. The 
governor's only power is to implement decisions taken in 
Jakarta; the same applies to lower-level officials. 
Occasionally, when policy disputes occur in Jakarta, 
Governor Carrascalao can exert some influence, using the 
narrow margins allowed him. He was able to raise the 
'opening-up' issue in 1988, which led to heated controversy 
between the army and the foreign affairs department. 
Foreign Minister Ali Alatas wanted the territory to be 
opened up because Indonesia was the target of international 
criticism due to Jack of access to East Timor. Indonesian 
diplomats argued that they could not plausibly defend the 
East Timor issue if nothing changed. They argued that 
outsiders should be allowed to enter East Timor; they may 
even be persuaded to believe that everything was fine. 
The military argued strongly against it, for security and 
economic reasons. The army feared that things on the 
security front could get out of control - which indeed hap-
pened. Since 1988, the East Timorese youth have utilised 
the slight opening of East Timor to their advantage. Several 
visits from outsiders have become rallying points to express 
opposition to Indonesian rule. The economic motive for the 
army's objection was fear of losing its monopolistic grip 
over the East Timor economy. All economic activity in East 
Timar, the coffee trade, the department stores, road con-
struction and development projects like school and office 
buildings and imports and exports, are directly run or 
controlled by the army. An economic opening, Governor 
Carrascalao hoped, would allow a free market to develop. 
President Suharto took the side of Alatas and Carrascalao 
and gave the green light to the opening up on 29 December 
1988. So far, this has achieved virtually nothing economi-
cally. Foreign investors have shown no interest in investing 
in East Timar, nor are Indonesian entrepreneurs queuing up 
to invest in East Timar. So far, the miJitary have managed 
to keep their stranglehold over the economy. 
On the security front, General Benny Murdani, the 
Minister of Defence, admitted that when Indonesian or 
foreign officials go to East Timor, it "will certainly become 
quite a big problem". Addressing Timorese officials in 
February 1990, Murdani warned that the armed forces 
would crush the resistance movement. Notwithstanding this 
threat, the 'smiling policy' seems to have prevailed, at least 
until the last quarter of 1990. 
The opening up of East Timar has remained a controver-
sial issue and has brought no improvement or relaxation in 
East Timar. The military have responded to unrest with 
heavy-handed repression, despite the presence of 
foreigners. New York Times correspondent Steve Erlanger 
on 21 October 1990, in an article entitled "East Timor, 
reopened by the Indonesians, remains a sad and terrifying 
place". reported that Asian and Pacific diplomats just back 
from a visit to East Timar "were stunned by the mood 
prevailing in Dili". 
The church in East Timor 
As with everything else these last fifteen years, the Catholic 
church has also undergone a transformation. The mass 
conversion of Timorese has meant th~t the population sees 
the church as a protection against Indonesian atrocities. 
Jakarta expects the church to support government pro-
grammes and refrain from getting involved in politics. Yet, 
the church cannot dose its eyes to social and political 
problems resulting from the Indonesian annexation. The 
church faces a daily dilemma: if it is seen as protecting the 
government's interests, the people will distance themselves, 
but if it sides with the people, it lands in difficulties with 
th~ government. In a situation where no political channels 
exist, where people cannot express their political aspir-
ations, the church is often used as an outlet. The Papal 
Mass in October 1989 and the mass to celebrate the 50th 
birthday anni~ersary of the Diocese of Dili in September 
1990, turned mto mass demonstrations for independence. 
The church sways, at times having a kind of 'cease-fire' 
with the a~y, at times antagonistic towards the government 
as when Bishop Belo wrote to the UN Secretary-General in 
February 1989 asking for a referendum. A recent outburst 
from Rear Admiral Sudibyo Rahardjo, chief of general staff 
of the armed forces, gave a dear indication of another 
difficult period ~or the ~hurch . In January 1991, he accused 
!he church ?f bemg behm~ a rash of demonstrations oppos-
mg J1aka~~ s rule . . Re~llmg the demonstration during the Popes vistt, he said: They were teenage boys, all from a 
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Catholic school. I'm sorry to say it but the church is behind 
this. The Catholic Church is the best organised force in the 
world and very well financed". This could herald a 
clampdown on church activities or an 'invitation' to some 
priests to depart. Little is known about the strength of 
liberation theology in East Timor but both Timorese and 
foreign priests are dissatisfied with being expected to 
mobilise people in support of government programmes. 
Shanana Gusmao has spoken sympathetically about the 
role of the church. In his recent interview with Robert 
Domm, he cautioned the clergy not to go too far against the 
Indonesians. "The clergy plays an indirect but very com-
mitted role, in the sense that actions of the Church }lave 
strengthened the popular, patriotic consciousness and helped 
the people see that we are the Maubere people and have 
nothing in common with the Indonesians. The Church has 
not spoken out openly; the clergy have not acted in a public 
or indiscreet way, but with intelligence in order to continue 
to be on the peoples' side". 
Integration, an Indonesian myth 
After 15 years of 'integration', it can be concluded that the 
Indonesians have failed in every field. Animosity and 
contempt towards Indonesians have deepened, the attempt 
to win the hearts and minds of the young Timorese has 
been counter-productive. Teachers complain of bad behav-
iour and Jack of interest of the schools. The youth have 
carried forward the banner of struggle from the older 
generation, developing new forms of resistance. However 
impressive on paper, development programmes have not 
benefitted the Timorese. It is the Indonesian army who is 
EAST TIMOR 
A Timorese resttlement village 
reaping the harvest while the average Timorese sees the 
army as the cause of the economic crisis. Allocation of 
government funds usually fail to reach their proper destina-
tion, because of corruption. One volatile issue is land. The 
uprooting of the population has left huge tracts of land 
empty and untended. To claim ownership, Timorese need to 
produce title deeds which most do not possess. Many new-
comers from Indonesia are buying up land, creating deep 
resentment. In the meantime the Timorese fear persecution 
and repression. They are not able to Jive according to their 
own customs and traditions. Lack of basic needs - food and 
health care in particular - makes Jiving in East Timor like 
Jiving a heJJ. The only just solution is for the East Timorese 
to be able to determine their own fate and political destiny. 
* 
Underground leaders on the 
clandestine movement 
On a visit to Jakarta last November, Liem Soei Liong of TAPOL interviewed three activists in the East 
Timorese clandestine movement. The three men are identified here only by initials. 
'MKR' from the Mambai tribe, was 11 years old in 1975. 
His father was a coffee plantation official in Ermera, under 
the Portuguese. When war broke out, MKR knew little 
about politics: 
The first thing was that we were forced to learn Indonesian 
and other things unrelated to our own history. In time, we 
started wondering why the war had started and why people 
were holding out in the bush to defend our people to the 
death against the Indonesian army. Everything was in stark 
contrast to the 12 months before the war started in 1975. 
We realised that something terrible bad happened. We were 
a people Jiving under great oppression, defending our 
aspirations against the Indonesian army which was sup-
pressing our aspirations. 
· I went to secondary school (SMA) in Kupang, then to 
university in Jakarta. At college, I met older people with a 
better understanding of politics; some had fought in the 
bush. I learnt many things from them and wanted to 
become involved. 
'FF' was studying at Francisco Xavier School at the time of 
the Indonesian invasion. He became involved with Fretilin 
in August 1975 and joined the school-pupils organisation, 
Unetim. 
When Fretilin took control of East Timor and set up a de 
facto administration, I was sent to organise people in 
villages and towns m preparation for the coming diffi-
culties. I attended the independence proclamation on 28 
November 1975. When the invasion occurred, I fled to 
Ailieu with Fretilin leaders, then to Same and Kablake. I 
was in Quelicai for more than a year and then went east, to 
Viqueque-Ossu where I mobilised the masses to face the 
Indonesians. 
In July 1979, I was at the Matebian base when Indonesia 
began its mass extermination campaign. In November, we 
were forced to Jet the population surrender, while I escaped 
to another region. There were many difficulties there but we 
began to learn how to organise the masses and prepare for 
underground work. 
On 15 July 1979, I was arrested with four friends by the 
Indonesians and brought to Dili. In 1980, I became active 
in the underground movement. 
'ML' was just finishing school in 1975 and left Dili with t 
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Fretilin when Indonesia invaded. 
I helped gather information and politicise society. I stayed 
in the mountains till 1979. After Indonesia's campaign to 
encircle and annihilate Fretilin, we realised that the balance 
of forces was very unfavourable so we surrendered, but this 
was not the end of the struggle. We surrendered in order 
the continue the war in the towns. That was our task. 
How many East Timorese men and women are studying 
in Indonesia at present? 
[MKR] I would say about a thousand, studying at various 
universities in Bali and Java - in Malang, Bandung, 
Surabaya, Yogyakarta, Salatiga, Solo, Jakarta and Kupang, 
as well as in Kalimantan. 
What control do the Indonesians exert on you? 
[FF] The intelligence closely watch young East Timorese 
and people in general. They realise that it is the younger 
generation who will carry the struggle forward until we 
achieve independence. Experience since 1975 shows that 
our young men and women are the ones who have died in 
the struggle - thousands have been exiled to prison camps. 
When the underground was set up in 1980, many who 
took part were from the younger generation. At the time of 
the rebellion on 10 June 1980, many young people took 
part, were arrested and exiled. This showed the Indonesians 
that the main force involved in the struggle was the youth. 
Facilities given to our youth by the Indonesians have not 
meant that Indonesia has persuaded the youth of East Timor 
to tum their backs on the struggle. 
Ever since 1980, young East Timorese wherever they are 
in Indonesia are involved in the underground according to 
their specific circumstances and abilities. The underground 
is under the leadership of our supreme command. 
Wounded East Timorese youngsters after demonstration 
In the past few years, the Indonesians arrested m~n.y 
students and school pupils. But it was harmful to Indonesia s 
foreign policy; they realised that they could not affor~ a 
confrontational approach so they devised a new mec~amsm 
- controlling all letters and communications, censonng all 
letters from abroad and controlling our communications 
with East Timor. 
When any of us goes on vacation to East Timor, they 
follow us to find out what we plan to do there. They know 
that our student organisation here is focused on the struggle 
of our people in East Timor so they have developed a 
special system of control. 
But we know that any day, the Indonesians could become 
more confrontational. In 1989, when demonstrations took 
place in Dili, when our youth raised their voices to call for 
independence for East Timor, the military did not them-
selves handle the situation probably because they were 
concerned about the impact on their diplomatic moves. 
Negotiations were under way about the visit of the Portu-
guese parliamentary mission to East Timor; this prevented 
Indonesia from taking a confrontational position. But in 
October 1990, they failed to reach agreement and the visit 
was postponed. So they began to adopt a more aggressive, 
confrontational stance; many young people were arrested, 
some were murdered, some tortured. The aim was to trace 
the location of leadership of the underground. 
They watch the East Timorese youth in Indonesia all the 
time. A time may come when they will become more 
confrontational if the underground endangers their interna-
tional position. But at present, they must weigh up the 
international repercussions of their actions. 
There are a number of East Timorese youth groups 
functioning in Indonesia. Does this reflect any split? 
No. Indeed, there are many organisations but they are alJ 
working towards the same goal. 
The three fronts in the struggle 
Up to the late 1970s, the emphasis was on armed strug-
gle. FF said just now that since then, there has been a 
shift towards political struggle in the towns. Does this 
mean that the armed struggle is no longer so impor-
tant? How should we assess the two forms of struggle? 
[FF] Up to 1979 or 1980, all activities were concentrated in 
the bases. But we began to realise that in physical terms, 
we could not face up to the might of the Indonesian army 
which has a constant supply of weapons. So our leadership 
instructed us to be active in the towns. But this does not 
mean ignoring or give up the military struggle. 
Three fronts were opened up, the military front, the 
underground political or clandestine front and the diplo-
matic front which had existed since 1975. But a clandestine 
front was needed to maintain links between the military 
front and the diplomatic front. From 1978 onwards, when 
the situation was stilJ very critical, it was very hard to 
organise this link, primarily because we were always being 
watched. In 1978, 1979 and 1980, we concentrated on 
keeping open the Jines of communication between the 
armed struggle in the bush and abroad. 
But in 1980, we began to organise mass actions and on 10 
June, there was a rebellion and many friends were killed or 
exiled. We began to recognise the role of the underground 
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struggle in linking the diplomatic front to the military front. 
But at all times, the leadership of the struggle is in the 
hands of the military front. The military front had mandated 
diplomatic representatives abroad to tell the outside world 
that the struggle in East Timor was continuing. How could 
this be done? By creating an underground front. 
The underground front has two tasks, to create a mechan-
ism to link the diplomatic front with the military front and 
to organise the masses, to convince our people that those 
who fought from 1975 tiJl 1980 were still fighting for the 
people's aspirations. 
Since 1980, awareness has heightened. Although, the 
Indonesians have succeeded in aiming blows at the clan-
destine movement and have destroyed much of it, we have 
not been defeated. Why? Because murder and exile only 
reinforces our nationalism and draws everyone into the 
underground in East Timor. 
There are various underground organisations because the 
situation differs from place to place. Jakarta is not the same 
as Bali, Bali is not the same as East Timor. Each under-
ground organisation must fix its own criteria to prevent our 
activities from being destroyed by the Indonesians. They 
all pursue a single aim, freedom and liberation for the 
people of East Timor. A number of clandestine groups and 
students organisations have come into existence; one is 
called Renetil, another is known as Rejutim. There are 
others as well, which have not yet become as well-known 
as these two. 
But although our movement has made significant progress, 
this doesn't mean that the military struggle is no longer 
important. The leadership is in the hands of the military 
front. The underground and the diplomatic front get their 
global orientation from the commander. 
We can say that in East Timor there is now an urban 
guerrilla movement - we call it the urbanisation of the 
guerrillas. But it operates under the supreme commander. 
Recently, we have begun to restructure our movement 
because all young East Timorese men and women are 
becoming involved. We realise that if there were a chal-
lenge, the army would take action. Our focus at present is 
to devise a new strategy to cope with the Indonesians. 
The second point is that in Indonesia a number of opposi-
tion groups are operating. The Indonesians call them 
separatist movements but we don't see them like this. They 
are pressing for the right to self-determination. Indonesia 
consists of 26 provinces but they are not united. There are 
plenty of prospects for the creation of other states. We have 
known about this type of struggle in Indonesia since the 
1960s when we in East Timor had contact with them. 
Jakarta's aim, to crush the guerrillas 
Some journalists who recently visited East Timor have 
noted a reduction in the level of armed conflict and a 
reduction in the number of Indonesian troops. They say 
ABRI could defeat the guerrillas but refrain from doing 
so because they need East Timor as a training ground. 
What do you say to this? 
[FF] This is something we have thought about. Indonesia is 
a large military power supported by the USA and other 
countries. It's wrong to say Indonesia doesn't want to crush 
the guerrillas. Ever since 1975, their aim has been to crush 
the guerrillas because they know that the guerrillas disrupt 
stability and obstruct development in East Timor. So, why 
doesn't Indonesia crush the guerrillas? Maybe what the 
journalists say, that Indonesia needs East Timor as a 
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training ground and a project for other countries is part of 
the answer. But there1s more to it than that. 
Indonesia has a powerful army yet it has been unable to 
destroy the guerrillas. Look at what happened in 1976, 1977 
and 1978 when Indonesia conducted a massive campaign. 
Then in 1981 and 1982, they mobilised the entire popula-
tion to crush the guerrillas, but failed. In 1983, there were 
negotiations between our commander, Xanana Gusmao and 
the regional commander, Colonel Purwanto. Indonesia 
hoped through these negotiations to convince Xanana to 
surrender, but this did not happen. 
East Timorese students seeking refuge in Motael Church 
The negotiations were very beneficial for Fretilin because 
all our people could see that a well-organised struggle was 
still going on. The Indonesians have tried hard to crush the 
guerrillas but the emergence of urban guerrillas has made 
this even more difficult. Then there are problems in Indo-
nesia itself. Indonesia cannot possibly deploy all its armed 
forces in East Timor. This would mean ignoring the 
challenge in Sumatra, and not fighting the OPM. 
Another point is that their campaign needs substantial 
economic backing, but this is not easy for Indonesia at 
present. There is a correlation between Indonesia's inability 
to crush the guerrillas and difficulties within Indonesia. 
Perhaps it's true to say that in 1979, Indonesia was more 
able to handle the guerrillas, but since 1980 it has been 
much more difficult for them to do this. 
When Indonesia started to colonise East Timor, they 
recognised that winning over the older generation was 
impossible and tried to win over the youth, setting up 
many schools, spreading the Pancasila. But they have 
failed to turn Timorese youngsters into 'good Indone-
sians'. Why? 
[MKR] There are many reasons. Let's look first at history. 
As compared with various parts pf Indonesia, East Timor 
before the arrival of the Portuguese had hardly any contact 
with the empires that existed in the rest of the archipelago; 
at most, links were confined to trade. There is no evidence 
that the pre-Portuguese kingdoms in East Timor paid 
tribute to the kingdoms of Sriwijaya or Majapahit. So, even 
before the Portuguese era, there were differences. 
The second thing is that East Timor was colonised by the 
Portuguese while Indonesia was colonised by the Dutch. 
There are many differences between them though they both 
came from western Europe. The Dutch, like the English and 
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the Germans, were not inclined to carry out a policy of 
assimilation, in contrast with the Spanish, the Portuguese 
and the Italians who were quick to assimi]ate. This is what 
happened in Latin America and also in East Timar. The 
Portuguese cuJture absorbed by the Timorese was initiaJly 
imposed by force but eventuaJly it happened by peaceful 
means, by assimiJation, by inter-marriage between Portu-
guese men and Timorese women. 
Another factor is reJigion. Before the Dutch reached 
Indonesia, outside religions - Hinduism and IsJam - had 
taken root. But things were different in East Timor. Each 
tribe had its own traditional beliefs and these were the 
reJigions that came into contact with CathoJicism from 
PortugaJ. 
So during 500 years of Portuguese coJonialism, a quite 
distinct society emerged which helped mold the character 
of our people. Yet, this process (of peaceful assimilation) 
did not always prevail. The Timorese people rebeJled 
against the Portuguese throughout the colonial era, from the 
moment the Portuguese set foot in our country. This has 
bred a high level of militancy among the Timorese. There 
were many battles, waged without any help from outside; 
often these rebellions were suicidal. This hardened our 
people, made them very tough, never wanting to surrender. 
After the political changes in Portugal, East Timorese 
students who had been studying in Portugal where they had 
made contact with students from other parts of the world, 
returned home. They waged a very effective campaign, 
dealing with concrete issues. Within a year, their campaign 
was very successful; the effects are stiJl felt today. They 
succeeded in arousing a nationalist, patriotic fervour among 
the East Timorese people, particularly in the ranks of 
Fretilin. This was done by peopJe like Carvarinho, Vicente 
Reis and others. 
When Indonesia came, it became apparent that Indonesian 
colonialism was very primitive as compared with Portu-
guese colonialism. The Indonesians were not as skilful as 
the Portuguese so it wasn't difficult for our people to 
understand what was going on, even illiterate people who 
had never been to school. No-one needed to be told, there 
was no need for any campaigning. The facts were there for 
all to see. The soldiers seet to East Timor behaved very 
brutally, caring nothing about human rights or existing 
regulations. All this happened when things worldwide were 
changing - there was a global shift towards emanicipation, 
many nations were fighting for liberation. So the Timorese 
were very quick to reject what the Indonesians did. This is 
true a]so for our youth. Their Jessons in schoo] about 
Indonesian history were empty phrases. such efforts can 
never succeed unless the East Timorese give up their 
yearning to liberate themselves - only then will Indonesia 
get its way. 
Indonesia faces challenges to its rule not only in East 
Timor but also in West Papua and Aceh. Do you see 
your solution being linked in any way with pressure on 
Indonesia to become a federation or perhaps even 
splitting up into several states? 
[FF] Some peop]e be]ieve that if East Timor were to win 
independence, this would set a precedent for other people. 
But my first point is this: when Indonesia procJaimed 
independence in 1945, it claimed only the territory under 
Dutch control, which excJudes East Timur. 
The question of whether Indonesia becomes a federation 
Indonesian soldiers, normal street scene in Dili 
or not may be valid but this is an internal affair and has 
nothing to do with us. Any state structure can u.n~ergo 
transformation. Indonesia today faces many contrad1cbons, 
especially between the younger and the older gene.rations. 
We realise that it is very difficuJt to expect Indonesia to let 
go of East Timor, partJy because, as you suggest, this couJd 
set a precedent. But peopJe in Indonesia should realise that 
independence for East Timor is something that cannot be 
stopped. Indonesia will continue to face enormous diffi-
culties because the boundaries of our underground struggle 
will continue to expand. Perhaps the time wi11 come, in ten 
or twenty years, when we will try to coordinate our actions 
with the opposition in Indonesia if Jakarta still insists on 
keeping hold on East Timor. 
We know how difficult it is for us to defeat Indonesia 
militari1y but nor can Indonesian defeat us militarily. And 
because of our diplomatic struggle, Indonesia will remain 
a focus of the world community, in Europe, the USA and 
in the Pacific. The diplomatic struggle will be very arduous 
and tough for Jakarta. If Indonesia continues to stick 
stubbornly to its position on East Timor, it may be that our 
solution wi11 be determined by internal Indonesian factors. 
Messages to the world 
What is your message to the outside world? 
First, to countries prompted by economic factors and other 
national interests and do not understand what we have gone 
through or refuse to acknowledge the righteousness of our 
aspirations. They should realise that we are only struggling 
for our basic right, for the application of international 
norms in the Universal DecJaration of Human Rights. 
To solidarity organisations, we express deepest gratitude; 
please intensify your work and devise new forms of 
struggle. Don't forget that by helping us achieve indepen-
dence, you are also helping to improve things globally. 
To NGOs like Amnesty International and Asia Watch, we 
say: please try harder to find effective ways of convincing 
the world that human rights violations do take place in East 
Timor. This is not just a matter of murder, torture and 
maltreatment; they should explain a]so why these violations 
occur - because our people want freedom. 
To our East Timorese countrymen abroad, we say: 
preserve unity and think of how each of you can become 
involved. Achieving independence depends first and 
foremost on our own personal efforts. Take part in the 
struggle, passively or actively. Don't pursue separate 
political or religious objectives. What we need now is 
independence. When we have achieved that, both Fretilin 
and UDT have said they want a multi-party democracy. * 
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Killings and arrests continue 
Several killings and disappearances, and many arrests are reported to have occurred in East Timor 
in the last three months of 1990, according to a report from human rights circles in Jakarta. 
Killings and disappearances 
Two students who fled to Lospalos from Dili on 22 
October, in the wake of attacks by the security forces on 
schools and subsequent clashes, are reported to have been 
killed immediately after being arrested. They are Francisco 
Oliveira, murdered on 23 October and Marcos Monteiro, 
murdered on 24 October 1990. 
The whereabouts of two other students, Mateus Jeronimo 
and Carciliano Oliveira, who fled from Dili to Lospalos on 
the same day, are not known. 
Another person reported to have been shot dead by troops 
is Constantino Kubileki, who had been fighting with the 
guerrillas. Kubileki was planning to surrender with three 
colleagues and approached Indonesian troops to discuss 
their surrender. When Kubileki was killed, the other three 
fled back into the bush. This incident occurred in October 
in Makadiki village, Uatolari sub-district, Viqueque, an 
area where guerriJJa units are known to be active. 
Four other killings occurred earlier in the year, all in the 
district of Viqueque. The victims have been named as 
Francisco Cesaltino, 20 years, a peasant from Loihuno, 
Viqueque , murdered on 20 April by troops of Battalion 
408 in Fatudo; Candido da Silva, 25, a peasant from 
Klalerek Mutin, Viqueque, murdered on 29 April by troops 
of Battalion 408; Raul da Silva, 21, occupation unknown, 
from Ossorua, Ossu sub-district, murdered on 31.5.1990 in 
Ossu, Lequimeta sub-district; Afonso da Silva, 23, 
occupation unknown, also from Ossorua, Ossu sub-district. 
Arrests 
By far the largest number of arrests recorded occurred in 
the district of Liquica, to the west of Dili, along the north 
coast. There were four waves of arrests, during which no 
fewer than 45 people were taken into custody. 
On 12 November, at least 22 persons were arrested in 
Liquica, all of whom are suspected of being in contact with 
the armed resistance. Four of the detainees, Filomeno 
Oliveira, Gregorio dos Santos, head of the agricultural 
affairs department, district of Liquica, Carlito dos Santos, 
head of Mudika Church, Liquica, and Jorge Goncalves, 
have since been transferred to Comarca-Balide Prison, Dili. 
The others who include Antonio Alves, former village head 
in Bazartete (a sub-district of Liquica), Alberto Pereira 
and Jaime, officials of the information department of the 
Liquica administration, and Amadeo dos Santos, former 
education department head at the same administration, were 
still being held at the kodim (army headquarters) in Liquica. 
A number of arrests also took place in Leorema viJJage, 
Bazartete sub-district from 23 to 29 November. They 
include Jacinto from Mategou village, Liquica district, a 
member of the Liquica second-level assembly, DPRD-II. 
Seven others were arrested, all on 19 November, in the 
village of Fahi-Lebo, sub-district of Bazartete, followed on 
25 November by five more arrests in Fatunero viJJage in 
Bazartete sub-district. One of these five, Estevao Lobato, 
sustained a broken leg when he was struck by a soldier. 
Independently of this information, it was reported from 
Dili late last year that International Red Cross officials were 
denied permission to visit Liquica and check on reports 
about prisoners being held there. 
Photo: Jan-Erik Forsberg 
Flamboyant Hotel, Baucau 
The document also includes the names of two armed 
resistance fighters being held at Flamboyant Hotel, Baucau. 
They are: Domingos Pinto, a Fretilin guerrilla captured in 
the bush, now being held by Special Task Force 86 of 
Kopassus (the para-commando red-berets) commanded by 
Zeki Anwar; and Olegario, a Fretilin group commander, 
captured in the bush and now being held in Hotel 
Flamboyant. (He may already have been released.) 
Hotel Flamboyant, a Portuguese hotel in Baucau, was 
used for many years after 1975 for interrogation and 
became notorious as a torture centre. It was renovated and 
restored for use as a hotel after East Timor was opened to 
tourists. An English tourist who visited Baucau in mid 1990 
and stayed at the hotel, discovered that buildings on the far 
side of the courtyard are still used as detention ceJJs. He 
was told that children from a nearby orphanage occasionally 
come to the hotel to see if a parent is being held there. 
During an incident in Ossuluga kampung, Baucau district, 
two youths were shot at by troops of Battalion 301. They 
fled to Baucau and reported the incident to local officials. 
Background 
There are suggestions that the military in East Timor, after 
trying for months to project a 'softly, softly' image, have 
changes tadics again. Press reports reveal not only that 
abuses have worsened but, to quote the BBC (29 October), 
the army's more relaxed policy "now appears to have been 
completely abandoned in an attempt to stamp out growing 
unrest", while Australian AP said Indonesia had increased 
troops numbers in Dili and were conducting intense search 
operations. (Sydney Morning Herald, 30 October 1990]-{'. 
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Shanana speaks, Part II 
The following is a continuation of the interview of Shanana Gusmao, commander of F alintil, given to 
the Australian, Robert Domm, when he visited the guerrilla leader in the bush in September last year. 
The first part of this interview was published in TAPOL Bulletin, No 103, December 1990. 
Time is on our side 
What is your analysis of the situation in East Timor 
today? Has it changed significantly recently? 
Our struggle is very difficult. Three or four years ago, we 
were still worrying about what would happen 'after Falintil 
has been exterminated' but now we see the extermination of 
Falintil as the price demanded by our country. It is cause 
for great pleasure and boundless pride in Falintil that our 
sacrifices have created the basis for a truly national resis-
tance, making it what it is today, an indestructible force. 
Internally, the situation is unparalleled and we make no 
attempt to conceal our pride in saying this. The things we 
hoped for at the start of this phase have become a brilliant 
reality, albeit at the cost of many lives of compatriots who 
have .fallen for the country. The confidence we have always 
had m the Maubere people's inexhaustible willingness to 
make sacrifices has been proven beyond doubt, giving us 
absolute faith in the need to win total victory. 
GJobally, we know time is on our side, not on the side of 
the generals. Militarily, we in Falintil are convinced we 
hav.e. done our duty; we are more prepared than ever, 
po11hcal1y, psychologicaJly and morally, to accept our own 
extermination, knowing fu11 we11 that this wilJ not bring the 
w~r to an end. The Maubere people wilJ go on fighting and 
wil1 never surrender, whichever way the winds of history 
blow. After fifteen years, our people have shown that they 
have never been discouraged; they know that the war wilJ 
no! ~nd qui~ldy, as long as Jakarta sticks stubbornly to its 
opmmn. This factor best reflects the internal resilience of 
Maubere resistance. 
Maubere traditions are sacred 
A new generation of East Timorese has grown up under 
pressure from Indonesia to forget their own history and 
'become Indonesians'. How successful has this been? 
Jakarta has always underestimated the strength of Maubere 
na~ionalism. !11 my opinion, the 'hearts and minds policy' 
rehes on the influence that Mario Carrascalao can allegedly 
exert on the Maubere people. However, this policy, which 
was Carrascalao's idea, has failed to impress the older 
generation for the simple reason that the guJf between the 
two outlooks is far too wide to be bridged by the ilJusion 
of material goods. 
Mario Carrascalao and Jakarta regard the Maubere people 
as inhabitants of a territory, on whom to bestow the benefits 
?f 'ci~ilisation'. As they see it, there is no nation, only 
inhabitants who are reduced to a statistical phenomenon. 
The political objective is to fmd the most effective way of 
healing the wounds of war in the hope that in time, public 
opinion will change. 
But they have not reckoned with the personality of the 
Maubere people, the many facets of the Maubere identity 
(which they have tried to exploit). In a word, they have 
never taken account of the Maubere soul. The people of 
East Timor are not at a point where they will use their 
traditions and folklore to promote tourism, nor do they want 
to invoke their traditions to recall the legends of their 
ancestors. The people of East Timor still regard their 
traditions and customs as something sacred. It is in their 
traditions and customs that their unique way of seeing 
things, their way of being, resides. The Maubere people 
judge themselves by the concept of honour, they are a 
~ 
proud people who hold material possessions in contempt. 
The M~ubere people work hard but never to get rich; 
eve~th~g they. earn from their Jabour is regarded as a way 
of ?nngmg .theu c.oncep~s. to bear on reality, simply a way 
t? 1.mmort~l.1se t~eu traditions and customs. Their existen-
hahst trad1h~ns he them inextricably to mother earth. Their 
custon_i~ are .1mpre~ate~ with real-life experience and with 
the spmtuahty that mspues their lives. 
Any poli~y . aimed at alienating the superstructure of 
Mau~ere thmking and behaviour is doomed to failure while 
causmg a rupture between their concept of mother earth 
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and, in its wider political context, their concept of the 
Maubere motherland. This concept of the motherland has 
been reinforced and consolidated by the invasion, the war 
and the military occupation. 
Material benefits offered by the forces of occupation have 
been rejected out of hand by the Maubere people who see 
them as an attempt to compensate for the sacrifices which 
they decided to make; they were rejected precisely for that 
reason. Moreover, they regard these benefits as demeaning 
the values of Maubere consciousness. They look upon 
material goods as necessities of everyday life, not as the 
purpose of life; their time on mother earth is a passing 
phase during which they must prepare themselves for an 
existence alongside their ancestors. Hence, honour and pride 
are never expressed through ownership of a house of bricks 
or a coffee plantation but through the number of cattle they 
can slaughter for a traditional ceremony, such as a funeral, 
when the deceased person takes with him or her the bulk of 
the wealth which, in Timorese eyes, consists of things like 
mortens, belaks, suriks, tais and so on. 
In my humble opinion, this is where the real confrontation 
takes place, a confrontation that turns into political con-
frontation. 
Schooling, which during the Portuguese colonial era was 
passive, has never held the Maubere people back, for they 
have always kept their traditions alive. The educational 
system so hurriedly foisted on the people in the past few 
years has been unable to destroy the Maubere soul; on the 
contrary, it has only led to alienation. 
EAST TIMOR 
The younger generation can be divided in two: those who, 
as children, saw the horrors of war, the bitterness, the 
sufferings, death, atrocities, grew up during the war and, 
crucially, took part in the resistance. It is difficult for 
children to forget a father who was slaughtered or a mother 
who has been ill-treated. It is difficult for children not to 
be upset about atrocities committed all round them. Inevi-
tably, deep down, a deep hatred wells up against foreigners 
who have come to kill our people, to outrage and oppress 
them, with the children being the direct or indirect victims. 
The other group are those born later; although they did not 
personally experience the horrors of war, they are well 
aware of all the injustices and crimes. They naturally take 
up the struggle because they have absorbed and carry 
forward the aspirations of their people. 
The kinds of struggle pursued by young Mauberes are the 
inevitable consequence of the continuing war, a genuine 
manifestation of Maubere nationalism; these young people 
are the indisputable confirmation of the indestructibility of 
the Maubere soul. A people will never be reduced to ashes 
if they are conscious of themselves, they will never be 
alienated from their own values if they know themselves. 
The new generation has carried forward that which we from 
the very beginning sought to unite, to safeguard and 
consolidate, the Maubere people and Motherland. -{t 
SOLIDAJUTY NEWS 
AKSI 
The new Australian solidarity organisation - AK.SI (Action 
in Solidarity with Indonesia) - held its inaugural workshop 
in Sydney on December 1, 1990. The aims were: 
1) to forge links with other groups with similar aims and 
objectives in Australia; 
2) to share information concerning the current situation of 
human rights and other recent socio-political developments 
in Indonesia; 
3) to come up with ideas for action to protest human rights 
violations in Indonesia and Australia's implicit role in this 
process. 
The workshop focussed on human rights in five topics: 
students, the environment, peasants, workers and self-
determination. Motions were carried to support the newly 
formed union, SBSM; to support a memorandum to be 
released by the Australian Rainforest Action Groups, ca11ing 
on the Australian government to ban tropical timber imports 
immediately; to call on the Indonesi~n government to 
release all students, religious · and political prisoners cur-
rently jailed-on trumped-up charges; to monitor the activ-
ities of Australian government agencies which are involved 
in the assistance of rural development programmes in Java 
and Eastern Indonesia; to call on human rights groups in 
Indonesia and Australia to respect West · Papuan demands 
for self-determination and to call on the Australian govern-
ment to give recognition to West Papuans in Australia as 
refugees. 
Endorsements of the AK.SI motions, expressions of 
support etc should be sent to AK.SI, PO Box K717, 
Haymarket, NSW 2000, Australia. Fax: (61) (06) 287 
1160. Tel: (61) (02) 660 8391. Email address: peg:awood 
Task Force Indonesia 
Task Force Indonesia (TFI), set up in October 1990, is "an 
international network of persons and groups engaged in 
critical monitoring, research and advocacy on a broad range 
of policy issues facing contemporary Indonesia." Based at 
Lanham-Seabrook, Maryland, the new activist organisation 
aims to bring together persons and groups concerned with 
Indonesian issues - political, human rights, economic, 
environmental, social and cultural - into contact through a 
concerted recruiting effort and the use of modem technol-
ogy. TFI has set up a number of autonomous issue-related 
working groups on such issues as East Timor, Aceh, 
women, transmigration, tribal peoples, poverty, the environ-
ment. 
For further information about TFI contact: John A. 
MacDougall, Coordinator, Task Force Indonesia. 7538, 
Newberry Lane, Lanham-Seabrook, Maryland 20706, USA. 
Tel:-301-552-3251 Fax: 301-552-4465 Email: apakabar 
(Peacenet) or 72436.3621 (Compuserve) 
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Odd words from Carrascalao 
It's our oil, says Mario 
Mario Carrascalao, the governor of East Timor, who has 
loyally served the country which has wrought such death 
and destruction on the people of East Timor, has been 
coming out with some rather odd statements recently. Take 
for instance his lament that the East Timorese seem to be 
losing out from the deal concluded between Indonesia and 
Australia for the exploitation of the huge off-shore oil 
reserves south of East Timor. 
For years, while the deal was under negotiation, he was 
silent but when it came up for ratification by the Indonesian 
Parliament he began to complain. It is important, he said, 
for the aspirations of the East Timorese people to be 
reflected in the agreement. He had to admit that he was not 
consulted about the deal as it was a matter for central 
government but he felt that he had been confronted with a 
fait accompli. 
"It would be unfair and politically unwise for the aspir-
ations of the East Timorese not to be catered for, and still 
worse if all we were left was to be able to smell (the oil) 
from afar. What we want, he said, is for the base camp to 
be located somewhere where our unemployed workers could 
participate. [Suara Karya, 11 September 1990) 
A month later, he was even blunter, fearing that the oil 
companies would base their operations in Kupang, West 
Timor, not in East Timor. 
"I can't agree with this because, if there is anything we 
contributed by integration with Indonesia, it is this oil. It is 
our right. If we were not integrated, it would be our right. 
That is part of our territorial waters." [Northern Territory 
News, 12 October 1990] 
But Carrascalao has, perhaps unwittingly, drawn attention 
to a very important piece of history. Was it not, after all, oil 
that persuaded Jakarta to stake a claim for East Timor? 
Australian petroleum companies certainly knew the 
immense value of the reserves hidden under the Timor Sea 
and already in 1975, saw the benefits of doing a deal with 
Indonesia rather than with the Portuguese or the Timorese. 
No Portuguese mission, please! 
Carrascalao's second foray onto the arena of international 
relations was to proclaim that the East Timorese do not 
want a visit by a group of Portuguese parliamentarians. And 
why should the East Timorese be so strongly against an 
event for which they have been waiting for years? Accord-
ing to Carrascalao, because "it would bring back the civil 
war that the people of East Timor have forgotten". 
"If the visit really goes ahead there will be rioting in Dili 
because some people will exploit it to organise demonstra-
tions", giving the MPs the impression that anti-Indonesian 
sentiments in the province (sic) were still strong. "I say 
categorically that all the information and reports spread by 
the foreign media about the East Timorese being anti-
Indonesian are not true." [Jakarta Post, 31 December 1990] 
Carrascalao's words were a godsend for Jakarta if not 
uttered at Jakarta's behest. Foreign Minister Ali Alatas was 
quick to respond, saying he fully understood the reason for 
the governor's remarks. It would be communicated toPortu-
Mario Ca"ascalao, getting 
desperate ? 
gal so that they know that "the East Timorese people 
themselves were opposed to the visit". [Straits Times, 1 
January 1991] 
The on-again, off-again mission 
For months, Ali Alatas has been grappling with a tricky 
diplomatic problem - how to prevent the Portuguese MPs 
from visiting East Timor without exposing Indonesia to any 
blame for the cancellation of the visit. After plans for the 
mission to visit East Timor in 1990 had to be abandoned 
because delay meant that the rainy season made the visit 
impratical, agreement was reached between Indonesian and 
Portuguese diplomats in New York that a team of UN 
officials would go to East Timor as an advance party to 
prepare the way for the visit. 
But things were thrown into confusion when Alatas told 
a press conference in Jakarta on 24 October that UN 
officials would accompany the Portuguese MPs because 
they could not be trusted to produce an objective report of 
their findings. Now, it seems, Jakarta is saying that the MPs 
will not be allowed to go to East Timor unless UN officials 
go with them. It has yet to be seen whether this is Lisbon's 
interpretation. With the MP's mission thrown into such 
confusion, how convenient for Jakarta to be able to tell 
Lisbon that the MPs are not wanted in East Timor because 
Carrascalao, of all people, has said so. · 
Australian MPs to visit East Timor 
While negotiations drag on about the Portuguese visit, 
Jakarta and Canberra have reached agreement for seven 
Australian parliamentarians to visit East Timor during the 
first week of February. It is hardly a coincidence that this 
is during the early part of the six-week session of the UN 
Human Rights Commission in Geneva. On its agenda is the 
res?lution _of the Human Rights Sub-Commission adopted 
at its session last August, calling on the Commission to 
consider t~e ~ituation in ~ast Timor. Indonesia, attending 
the Comm1ss1on for the first time this year as a member 
will be working desperately hard to undermine any move~ 
~o ~en~ur~ it over ~ast Timor~ and a favourable report from 
objective Austrah_an MPs will come in very handy. 
The seven MPs mclude four from the Australian Labour 
Party, two from the Liberal Party and one from the National 
Party. Heading the team _will be Leo McLeay, Speaker of 
the House of Representatives. {r 
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Another look at 1965 
A leading Jakarta weekly has taken a fresh look at the events of October .1965. It published startling 
new revelations about CIA information that generals would be killed. 
The Jakarta weekly, Tempo [6 October 1990) has published 
a series of articles with new insights into the events of 
October 1965. Unusually for any Indonesian publication, it 
argues that much is still unknown about what really 
happened. Although it is said that 'time heals aJI wounds', 
the journal believes that time could also unearth a lot of 
secrets. 
The role of Adam Malik 
One article is based largely on CIA assessments of the 
political conflicts in Indonesia prior to and following 1 
October 1965. One CIA document dated 30 December 
1964 discussed possible scenarios should President Sukarno 
die. The armed forces (ABRI) was determined to prevent 
the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) from taking power. 
The CIA believed there was little chance that ABRI would 
be able to seize power in the event of Sukarno dying soon, 
and says it planned to collaborate with a civilian who 
managed to come forward. The most likely person was 
thought to be Adam Malik, then the minister of foreign 
trade and well-known for his anti-communist views. 
But the CIA recognised that as long as Sukarno remained 
president, the PKI would grow in strength; if Sukarno 
stayed alive for another five years, the chances of the PKI 
taking power were high. 
The name of Adam Malik crops up in another of the 
Tempo articles. This considers th¥ revelation by Kathy 
REVEALING 
MODERN GENOCIDE 
ON PAPUA LAND 
I SYSTEMATIC DESTRUCTION 
OF ASIA'S AMAZON 
World Bandits Set Foot 
in Irian Jaya 
No. 4 • 5, January· June 1990 
This packed issue of the journal of Skephi (NGO Network 
for Forest Conservation in Indonesia), a hefty 96-page 
issue, can be obtained from TAPOL. £3.00 plus £1.00 
post & packing (UK or surface worldwide) or £3.00 (air) . 
Kadane in The Washington Post [23 May 1990) that US 
embassy official, Robert Martens, who collected five 
thousand names of communists and passed them on to the 
Indonesians, shared his names with Kim Adhyatman, the 
personal aide of Adam Malik. Although retired army 
intelligence officers like Sutopo Yuwono and Yoga 
Sugomo have denied that these names were of any 
significance in the army's crackdown against the PKI, 
Tempo now quotes Adhyatman as saying that Martens did 
have important infomrntion not known to the army, for 
instance the list of members of D.N. Aidit's Biro Khusus, 
the body which maintained Aidit's links with what were 
believed to be sympathetic army officers. 
Adhyatman always gave any new names he got from 
Martens to Adam Malik who was 'very anti-PKI.' He goes 
on to say that Adam Malik's link with the army 'was very 
close indeed. He met General Yani [then the army 
commander] once or twice a week.' 
Another CIA document makes it clear that the CIA 
already knew in September 1965 that plans to murder 
Indonesian generals were afoot. On 14 September, 
Brig.General Parman, the army's intelligence chief, (himself 
among the six who were murdered on 1 October) told 
General Y ani of the plan. Y ani reported this to Sukarno 
giving him a list of the generals who were targeted. The 
list included aJJ the six who were killed, plus General 
Nasution who escaped, and another three generals, Suharto, 
Mursyid and Sukendro. Yani had been told the attacks 
would occur on 18 September but when nothing happened, 
he gave no further credence to the report. [This raises the 
question why the three were removed from the list. The 
explanation regarding Sukendro is probably straightforward; 
he was abroad on the day it happened. Mursyid played no 
further part after the murders, unlike Suharto who was 
unquestionably ready to take action against the plotters. 
Many who read Tempo's account will be wondering why 
Suharto's name was removed from the list.) 
Another document quoted at some length by Tempo was 
written by Edward E. Masters, chief politics officer at the 
embassy, who later became the US ambassador in Jakarta. 
In the document written three weeks after 1 October , 
Masters is quoted as saying: "Luckily, some key generals 
escaped and one of them, Suharto, was ready to fight back 
and he had the troops to do so." Only too true, except that 
Suharto did not escape; no-one tried to kidnap him. 
Masters also wrote that, after the events of 1 October, it 
would have been best for the army had the PKI staged an 
open revolt as this would have given the army the chance 
to crush it. A campaign to pulverise the PKI, if successful, 
would, according to Masters, completely paralyse the 
communists. This is indeed what happened, says Tempo. 
Masses of people attacked the PKI, tearing it to pieces. By 
January 1966, the CIA was able to report to Washington .. 
that the PKI had ceased to exist. 'r 
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More on the massacres 
Another of Tempo's articles produces evidence of .the 
unbridled campaign of slaughter unleashed aga.mst 
communist suspects in Indonesia from October 1965. Bitter 
social conflicts had broken out in 1965, with anti-
communists mustering their forces as the PKI showed its 
muscle. In particular, the struggle by the PKI and its 
peasants' union, BTI to take unilateral actions to imp.Jement 
land reform decreed by Jaw, led anti-commumsts to 
intensify their preparations for a sho:wdo~n. . . 
Militants from Muslim and nat10nahst orgamsat10ns 
sought mystical powers to protect themselves in dealing 
with the PKI. Everyone was 'getting ready for combat'. In 
Bandung, nature-lovers were given military training by the 
RPKAD (para-commandos) who also trained young non-
communists (sic) in Solo, especially after 1 October. 
Tempo then gives details of many killings that followed 
the failure of the 1 October plot, in which communist 
suspects were the victims of revenge. (Such information 
has never before, to our knowledge, been openly divulged 
in the Indonesian media.) 
* In Pupuan Village, Tabanan, Bali, PKI members were 
drive to the edge of a hole then beaten or struck down. 
Elsewhere, people who were still alive were carried with 
their hands and feet tied, the way pigs are carried. 
* In Central and East Java, violence proved unavoidable. 
Some youths returning from a demonstration to welcome 
the RPKAD in Solo on 22 October 1965, were set upon by 
members of the Pemuda Rakyat (leftwing youth 
organisation); 28 members of nationalist and Muslim 
organisations died. On hearing this, non-communist groups 
went into action and arrested tens of thousands of PKI 
people. At the time, it was estimated that 60% of the 
450,000 inhabitants of Solo were PKI members. "About a 
thousand were shot dead because they tried to escape," said 
Djoko Sediono, commander of the 'Blue Jackets' operations 
corps. 'There was no slitting of throats in Solo, as happened 
in East Java. Some took the Jaw into their own hands, but 
only in remote villages, beyond the army's reach.' 
'Our task was not to murder PKI detainees... but. to 
capture them and hand them over to the Interrog~tton 
Team,' said Mucharom, deputy commander of the ~Jue 
Jackets'. Another source said that a number of PKI captives 
'were shot on orders from higher up'. He said they were 
'loaned' [dibon] from their place of detention on the pretext 
that they were being moved. 
* In Y ogyakarta, no fewer than 30,000 were arrested, 
though only about half were communists. (Retired) Colonel 
Mus Subagyo, former commander of Yogya military poJice 
said 'it was the army that cleaned up (sic) the PKI'. 
* In Medan, North Sumatra, where social conflict had 
been particularly intense, organised Muslim y~ungsters 
attacked a PKI centre in Kampung Kolam, 15 kilometres 
from Medan. During a series of assaults, no fewer than 
5,000 PKI people were murdered. The bodies were thro~n 
in the river. 'For six months, no-one wanted to eat fish 
from the river because they often found human fingers 
inside the fish.' 
* Revulsion was the response of a civil guard in Pasuruan, 
East Java who witnessed mass killings of PKI people. 
Every night, dozens of PKI prisoners were 'dibon' from the 
detention centres and taken to Kedung Gambir, south 
Pasuruan or to a disused Japanese airfield in Raci where 
they were slaughtered, 'By five pm, Pasuruan was as quiet 
as a graveyard. People were too sickened to go out.' The 
proprietor of a factory in Pasuruan, a member of the 
Muslim party, Masyumi, tried to protect two employees 
from being killed because they were thought to be PKI 
members. He told them to climb a tree; the next morning, 
he took them to the village office and told them to become 
members of another party. 
* In Wonosobo, Central Java, a former local Nahdatul 
Ulama branch chairman, now 67 years old, was also 
disgusted by the whole thing. He said a PKI member 
sought protection from him on 5 October 1965. 'I wanted 
the PKI to be banned but I didn't want their people to be 
killed. That was anarchy, leading to chaos.' 
'Ex-PKI screened for the right to vote 
The Head of the Social and Political Affairs Department of 
the Central Java administration, Colonel Misnadi, 
announced in November that about 300,000 former PKI 
prisoners were being screened to determine whether they 
would be allowed to vote at the 1992 general elections. 
However, the security apparatus still needed to maintain 
vigilance against untoward developments, said the colonel. 
The public was called upon to watch out for groups which 
surreptitiously try to find cracks through which to infiltrate 
the community. Some groups, he said, try to influence the 
community by making a pretence of defending the people 
or defending human rights, but their real motive was to 
cause unrest. A month later, Colonel Misnadi announced 
that 291,000 former PKI prisoners would be allowed to vote 
in 1992, after being subjected to stringent investigations. 
"Those who have been given the right to vote have a well-
established awareness of citizenship," he said. 
A total of 9,000 would not be allowed to vote because 
they were still being given guidance. 
Still prohibited from going abroad 
A prohibition on ex-members of the PKI to travel abroad 
is still in force. The immigration authorities will not 
consider passport applications from ex PKI members unless 
they wish to travel for specified reasons and have a recom-
mendation from the provincial social and political affairs 
department, said the head of Surabaya's Immigration Office. 
An example was given of a passport appJication from 
somebody in Mojokerto. Cleverly (sic), the applicant 
attached a 'good-conduct' certificate from the local police 
to the effect that the applicant had not been a member of a 
banned organisation. 
But the application form raised suspicions because the 
applicant's identity card number had not been entered by the 
police. After further investigation, the applicant [identified 
in the news item as 'TS', 62 years old; his street and city 
was added, for good measure] was found to have been a 
former PKI member. 
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CONFERENCE REPORT 
The 6th NFIP Conf ere nee 
For the second time, TAPOL sent an observer to the Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific, in 
Aotearoa in November. About 130 people from 28 countries discussed a number of burning issues in 
the Pacific area. For TAPOL, West Papua and East Timor were top priorities. For the first time, the 
South Moluccas was also on the NFIP agenda. 
The NFIP movement has, since the start, been a movement 
with different interests. The many issues - nuclearisation, 
militarisation, colonisation, land rights, destruction of the 
environment, liberation struggles and many other issues are 
dealt with at one and the same time. This has always been 
the strength of the NFIP movement, the ability to synthesize 
all the movements in the area, each pursuing similar or 
different issues for a better world. But this heterogeneity 
has brought problems in establishing priorities and focal 
points. Attending an NFIP conference is an enriching 
experience, an opportunity to hear diverse country reports 
from dedicated activists in the region. 
Fifteen years on, the well-tested NFIP movement has 
shown that it is a viable movement that will continue for as 
long as necessary. 
The Aotearoa conference 
In many ways the latest conference was quite distinct from 
earlier ones, in particular the Manila conference three years 
ago. Firstly, the balance between the two core issues - the 
nuclear free issue and the independence issue as expressed 
in the movement's name. In Manila, during the workshops 
and the special themes, the conference organisers succeeded 
in creating a balance between the two issues. 
In practice, the two issues are a source of friction between 
NFIP participants because of the difference in emphasis and 
focus. In the Poworenga (the name of the Maori marae, the 
site of the conference) workshop themes, the emphasis 
shifted decisively away from denuclearisation and focused 
on matters like political and economic independence, land 
rights, militarisation and the grave question of the Johnston 
Atoll chemical dumping, Bougainville, Fiji, West Papua and 
East Timor. It is still too early to tell, but the end of the 
cold war may explain why the nuclear issue has become 
less prominent. 
But at the same time, an artificial division was created 
between indigenous and non-indigenous issues. This 
created unnecessary frictions and tensions. It has to be 
assumed that anyone attending the NFIP conference should 
adhere to the NFIP Charter, irrespective of their ethnic 
background. Judging from the spirit of the conference, 
future NFIP conferences will hopefully put an end to this 
division. 
As with any conference, other flaws could be mentioned, 
but many of the unresolved matters wiJI hopefully be 
tackled in the more frequent regional meetings~ Many of the 
issues could not be resolved in a few days of conference, 
fundamental issues such as guidelines if indigenous people 
are being oppressed by their own elite, complicated issues 
like Bougainvi11e's right to self-determination, the increas-
ing development of capitalism/free-trade zones in the 
Pacific area, and militarisation (including military coups) in 
the Pacific region. In the spirit of the NFIP movement it is 
to be hoped that a lot of research and input will give the 
NFIP movement the proper tools and guidelines to function 
in an internationalist way. 
The Indonesian colonies 
The conference welcomed the inclusion of the South 
Moluccas into Region 2 (later, endorsed in a resolution) and 
therefore will create a new forum for the South Moluccans 
to promote their right to self-determination and to present 
the history of the region in an objective way. The West 
Papuan delegation forwarded a strong resolution in which 
they urged the NFIP member organisations to pressure their 
respective governments to grant asylum to West Papuan 
refugees and activists; to grant scholarships to West 
Papuans and to respond positively to calls for West Papua's 
promotion to observer status within the Melanesian Spear-
head Group and the South Pacific Forum. Two resolutions 
on East Timor were endorsed at the conference - an urgent 
resolution on the fate and imprisonment of young East 
Timorese independence fighters, and a resolution 
reconfirming the commitment of NFIP members to actively 
promote the independence struggle of East Timor; to dis-
seminate information on the issue; to hold annual protests 
on 7 December, the day of the Indonesian invasion and to 
find financial support for the Timorese struggle, Needless 
to say all three regions are equally seen by the NFIP 
members as Indonesian colonies in the Pacific region. In the 
discussion on the situation in Fiji, Indonesia's encroachment 
through military supplies to Rabuka were seen as a grave 
danger and part of the process of militarisation .in the 
region. The participants left the conference, the Gulf crisis 
in full swing, with a determination to improve the work and 
coordination of the NFIP. * 
Indonesia Conference .is good news/ 
Peacenet's reg.indonesia conference accessible on all 
APC ~er electrorlio. mail networks, is a1J19.M<t 
of TFI and Indonesia Publications. It is a cheap and 
easy way of keeping up to date with the latest news 
on Indonesia, East Tiinor and West Papua andi 
provides an international foJum for j()Jidarity 
groups, academics, students and other 
Indonesia-watchers. 
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LAND DISPUTES 
Military blocks farmers'protest 
Seventy peasants from Cianjur district in West Java were 
stopped on their way to Jakarta, on December 20, to protest 
against the seizure of their land by the state 'forestry 
company, Perhutani. Together with ten students accom-
panying them and their lawyer from the Bandung Legal Aid 
Institute (LBH), they were 'escorted' back to Cianjur by 
security men. The students, ten peasants and the lawyer 
were then taken in for questioning. During the interrogation, 
the detainees were beaten. They were later released. 
The peasants, from Cimaeuwahgirang in Cikalongkulon 
subdistrict, were on the way to Parliament in Jakarta to 
protest the loss of 400 hectares of land they have cultivated 
since 1944. In 1967 the farmers made payments to the local 
land reform committee which entitled them to a 'Letter-C' 
document, confirming them as the lawful cultivators of the 
land. Perhutani has refused to acknowledge the peoples' 
rights and has claimed the land for a social forestry pro-
gramme. 
According to forestry conservation NGO SKEPHI, The 
social forestry programme widely advocated by the Depart-
ment of Forestry on behalf of the government, along with 
Yogya students oppose Visit 
Indonesia Year 
Visit Indonesia Year 1991 will only favour investors and 
suppress the poor, said students from Yogyakarta and 
villagers from Parang Tritis in Central Java protesting 
against the programme. The protesters, who assembled on 
Yogyakarta's Jalan Malioboro in the morning of December 
29, marched to the city hall after distributing leaflets and 
copies of statements to the public. 
A woman student and a leader of the villagers read out 
statements expressing concern over the inappropriate 
development of Parang Tritis, a tourist resort on the south 
coast of the province. Speaking for the student group 
Simpatis, the student said tourism related projects had 
affected local inhabitants. "They have incurred losses 
through the land acquisition process." She said that the 
students were concerned at the fate of the Parang Tritis 
residents who had gradually been edged out by tourism. 
"The Parang Tritis residents are becoming vagabonds in 
their own town. They were born here, but they no longer 
possess land." [Source: Jakarta Post, 31 December 1990] 
Women's Rights Protest 
About 30 women - students from several universities in 
Yogyakarta, Central Java, and housewives - demonstrated 
at the Yogya local Assembly (DPRD) in December. The 
women, grouped under the Yogyakarta Women's Discussion 
Forum wanted to remind the Assembly that they should not 
forget women's rights. 
With red ribbons tied around their heads, the protestors 
carried posters saying "Give Women Back Their Rights" 
Perhutani, does not in fact promote the people's interests. 
Development in the forestry sector is directed towa!ds the 
exploitation of the forest lands rather than promotmg the 
social and cultural needs of the local community. It is clear 
from a number of field studies that the forestry authorities 
frequently ignore traditional communal forestry ownership. 
In other words, the social forestry programme so far is run 
by business operating as an extension of the government.' 
LBH open letter 
In an open letter to Armed Forces Commander Gen. Try 
Sutrisno, LBH Chairman Abdul Hakim Garuda Nusantara 
and Secretary Achmad Santoso, called for the security 
officers who harassed the farmers to be punished. They also 
demanded security for the farmers, voicing their concern 
that the military would continue to intimidate the farmers. 
"Stopping the bus and maltreating the farmers was illegal," 
said the letter dated 21 December. 
[Sources: Jakarta Post, December 24 & 27, 1990, Media 
Indonesia 21 December 1990, SKEPHI statement, 21 
December 1990] * 
"Stop Exploitation of Women", "Increase the Wages of 
Women Workers", entered the DPRD grounds where they 
waited to meet the Chairman and his staff. While waiting 
they sang songs and held poetry readings, attracting the 
attention of passers by who packed the pavements on JaJan 
Malioboro. The DPRD members eventually received the 
women and told them they accepted their suggestions in 
principle, but that they involved matters beyond the DPRD's 
authority. [Source: Jawa Pos, December 24, 1990] * 
West Papua: The 
Obliteration of a 
People 
The first two editions of this book 
appeared in 1983 and 1984. This 
third edition, published in response 
to continuing demand, has been 
substantially revised and updated, 
with new data on military operations, 
an appendix on the murder of the 
well-known West Papuan anthropol-
ogist, Arnold Ap, and recent informa-
tion about the exploitation of West 
Papua's natural resources. 
Published by Tapol, the 
Indonesia Human Rights 
Campaign. 160pp. 
Price: £3.50 Sterling 
plus postage 
Tapol , 111 Northwood Road, 
Thornton Heath, Surrey CR4 
8HW, UK 
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ARMS SALES 
Arms sales to Indonesia must stop 
On 21 November 1990, British Aerospace took out a full-
page advertisement in one of Jakarta's leading dailies, Suara 
Pembaruan . Under the headline, Spear Head, Britain's 
leading arms manufacturer, describes the fe&tures of its 
Hawk ground-attack aircraft (20 are now operational in 
Indonesia), the Rapier, the "well-tested defence system 
against low-flying aircraft" also now being deployed in 
Indonesia, the Harrier jet, capable of vertical take-off and 
landing, the Landrover which is "particularly suitable for 
rough terrain", and the Sea Skua, a "hi-tech guided 
missile". 
Such high profile advertising in a widely-read . daily 
newspaper is usually intended to excite the general public's 
interest in advance of a deal, and there have been hints of 
a forthcoming deal. The London Sunday Times [September 
30 1990] reported that "British Aerospace is close to 
winning a deal worth several hundred million pounds from 
Indonesia for its Hawk jet in the latest of a spate of orders". 
In March 1990, the same company flew two Tornados of 
the Interdictor Strike type to Jakarta, under the auspices of 
the British embassy, in a bid to win a huge order for this 
"all-weather strike aircraft". This is the second time this 
bomber has been displayed in Indonesia in two years. The 
Tornado which is spreading so much death and devastation 
in Iraq is manufactured by Panavia, a company jointly 
owned by German, Italian and British arms manufacturers. 
Since 1978 - when the slaughter in East Timor was 
reaching a climax - the UK has become a leading arms 
supplier to Indonesia. Besides the two squadrons of Hawks, 
Britain has supplied £340 million worth of Rapier air 
defence missiles, three 'tribal class' frigates, seawolf missile 
launchers, and Saladin, Saracen and Ferret armoured cars. 
continuation from page 11 
to allow time for a proper investigation of the off-shore 
region, or accept the findings of experienced Indonesian 
geologists. 
The Iraq-Kuwait spectre 
As it happens, the controversy raged in the wake of Iraq's 
irivasion of Kuwait after a dispute over Baghdad's objection 
to Kuwaiti exploitation of oil resources claimed by Iraq. 
Using the analogy, some officials warned that any delay in 
ratification might lead Australian companies to end their 
moratorium on exploiting Timor oil, with unpredictable 
consequences. Alatas warned that a protracted conflict over 
the oil could threaten peace and security in the region. Such 
scare-mongering was designed to increase the pressure on 
MPs. 
Darwin Forum calls for suspension 
A few weeks earlier, a forum in Darwin unanimously called 
for the suspension of the Treaty "until the conflict in East 
Timor is resolved and the East Timorese people exercise 
their right of self-determination acknowledged by the UN". 
It called on the Australian government to support efforts at 
the UN to ensure the resolution of the conflict instead of 
UJUNG TOMBAK 
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Full page British 
Aerospace ad in an 
lndonesi.an newspaper. 
The chief supplier is British Aerospace, which built the 
army's Institute of Technology in Malang East Java, at a 
cost of £3 million and has a wide-ranging programme of 
cooperation with Indonesia's aerospace company, IPTN. 
Pressure on the British government 
We call on our readers in the UK to write to your MP. Ask 
her/him to urge the government to halt arms sales to 
Indonesia. The major industrial countries refused to halt 
arms sales to Iraq, bolstering a regime that violated human 
rights with impunity and decided to trample underfoot the 
rights of a neighbouring country. Saddam Hussein was 
entitled to think: "If Suharto could get away with grabbing 
East Timor, why shouldn't I do the same?" 
Stop all arms sales to Indonesia without delay! 
putting public resources into the exploitation of the petro-
leum potential of the Timor Gap. 
Evans' 'blazing trail' 
In a written statement to the Forum, Senator Evans 
described the Treaty as a "trail blazing agreement". In an 
oblique reference to events in the Middle East, he said it 
challenged the idea that drawn-out border disputes of 
strategic importance will ultimately lead to armed conflict. 
Senator Evans rejected the view that the Treaty is an 
impediment to an independent East Timor. 
"The fact is that by 1979, when negotiations on the Treaty 
commenced, there was no realistic prospect that East Timor 
would become an independent entity. That is still the case 
and would continue to be the case in the absence of the 
Treaty. Since 1979, successive Australian governments have 
taken the view that, whatever the unhappy (sic) circum-
stances of Indonesia's incorporation of East Timor, that 
incorporation should be recognised on a de jure basis." 
This statement ignores the fact that Australia's de facto 
and de jure recognition were the essential preliminaries to 
negotiations about the oil. 
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UMAN RIGHTS 
Stop the Gulf War 
and hold referenda in West Papua and East Timor 
On January 14, the eve of the Gulf War, a new Committee 
against the War in the Gulf, which includes human rights, 
student and Muslim groups, issued a statement strongly 
opposing the war. The statement also made a call for 
refefenda in East Timor and West Papua, the first time such 
a demand has been made publicly in Indonesia. 
On 21 January, hundreds of protestors called for an end 
to the war in demonstrations outside the US embassy and 
the Bank of America. 
A Call for the End to War 
Since the end of the Second World War, a tiny group of 
people in control of the American government and economy 
have, in defence of their own · economic and political 
interests, regularly dragged their people into war. This has 
happened despite opposition from the American people 
themselves and the American people's own desire for peace. 
We continue to hold the belief that the American people 
love peace. They do not want history to repeat itself: 
every generation of American people suffer the bitter effects 
of war. 
Those using war to protect their own economic and 
political interests always endeavour to make their reasons 
sound beautiful: we hear the terms World Policeman or 
Defenders of Democracy. Yet, history shows that such 
words are no more than slogans: they always cover up a 
policy of double standards. We, the countries of the third 
world, have so often felt just how these people have 
operated to destabilise our security, political, cultural, and 
economic life. Our natural resources are ravished, while we 
remain poverty stricken; our so-called independent and 
active foreign policies are twisted and turned into policies 
in support of their interests; their cultural values which our 
own irresponsible leaders allow to be imposed to rob our 
people of their moral heritage and their values of human 
solidarity; and several Third World countries have felt 
directly the oppression of direct military aggression. Even 
when this tiny group has not ordered direct aggression they 
are often playing behind the scenes, giving or selling 
military equipment to our governments on the one hand 
while trying to pit one against the other on the other hand. 
Even the most stupid person understands that war is 
always against the interest of the people. It is always the 
ordinary people that suffer the most loss of life. Human and 
natural resources, which would be better used to solve 
problems of human welfare, are wasted. The environment 
and eco-system is damaged, also raising the possibility of 
affecting the climate or bringing on a green-house effect. 
For these reasons, the ANTI GULF WAR COMMIITEE 
call for the comprehensive resolution of the Gulf Crisis, 
through the following means: ' 
1. The withdrawal of the multi-national and Iraqi forces 
from their respective areas of aggression; 
Demonstration in front of the US embassy in Jakarta 
2. So that such a crisis as the Gulf Crisis, which in its 
essence stems from and is itself a violation and rejection of 
human rights, is not repeated again, then other similar 
cases and problems should also be resolved. Such. cases 
include: the case of the Palestinian people, the East Timar 
people, the West Papuan people, the South African people, 
the Cambodian people, the Panamanian people, the 
Northern Ireland people, the Filipino people and so on. 
These peoples should be allowed to resolve their situations 
through referenda. 
3. There should be a referendum as soon as possible in 
Kuwait. 
4. The control of the waters of the Gulf should be left in 
the hands of the peoples of the Gulf themselves. 
5. All those who have suffered as a result of this crisis 
should be compensated. * 
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